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Abstract 
Background: Most reciprocation and outcome interdependence research has investigated 
how features of the situational context – including intergroup dynamics, normative scripts, 
inequality, and patterns of outcome dependence – affect the levels or frequency of 
reciprocation. Very little research has studied how the interactional behaviours of 
individuals can influence reciprocation over time. The present research aims to study 
intergroup reciprocation in interactive contexts where resource allocation elicits responses 
from a social network.   
Methods: Interactional data were collected in the lab using the Virtual Interaction 
Application Platform (VIAPPL) platform which provides a virtual environment in which 
participants exchanged tokens over a series of rounds, under varied experimental 
conditions, such as Group Context where individuals either played in distinguished group or 
undistinguished; Status where individuals played as either unequal or equal groups; and 
Norm conditions (no norm, fairness, & competition). Analysis was done to assess the 
dependences in the data over rounds, and to investigate the predictors of reciprocation and 
the conjunction of conditions that promote reciprocation. 
Results: The results showed that, when individuals were in clearly distinguished groups, 
they reciprocated more to the ingroup than to the outgroup. This was also true when Status 
and Norm Conditions were accounted for. It was however noted that the Norm Condition of 
fairness moderates ingroup reciprocation somewhat while the norm of competition 
heightened it even further. Ingroup reciprocation strengthened over time. Status did not 
influence reciprocation. 
Conclusions: This study offers support for Yamagishi, Jin, and Kiyonari’s (1999) theory of 
Bounded Generalized Reciprocity. It also adds to the literature by illustrating how group-
based reciprocation bias can evolve over time in a generalized context as well as how the 
norm of fairness can moderate ingroup ingroup reciprocation bias. Reciprocation evolved – 
with ingroup reciprocation becoming stronger - over time in the group context only, this 
suggests that there are special properties in this context that may not be present in other 
contexts. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
Reciprocation, the act of repaying those who have shown you favour or disfavour in kind, is 
apparent in everyday life. We often feel obligated to reciprocate actions towards them. For 
instance, when we receive gifts (for birthdays, weddings, anniversaries etc.), we feel 
obligated to return this favour. This sort of behaviour has also been observed in other 
animals including birds. Research has shown that birds, such as Black-winged Blackbirds, 
often protect each other’s nests. These birds often protect the nests of those birds that 
have protected their nest and do not protect the nest of those who have not helped them 
(Olendorf, Getty, Scribner, 2004).          
Background 
Much of the early work regarding reciprocation postulated that individuals will help all those 
who have helped them and will not hurt all those who have helped them, either for 
utilitarian purposes (Malinowski, 1932) or for moral reasons (Gouldner, 1960). Therefore, 
individuals who give will be reciprocated to in all contexts including group contexts, contexts 
of inequality, and varying norms.  
The work of Thibaut and Kelley (1959) served to problematize this understanding of 
reciprocation. They argued that when group dynamics are introduced, the 
interdependencies that develop between ingroup members are likely to influence 
reciprocation.  
Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament’s (1971) minimal group experiments showed that 
individuals will act differently towards ingroup members, favouring them. While they raised 
the idea of social identity as an explanation, Yamagishi, Jin, and Kiyonari (1999) argued that 
bounded generalized reciprocity explained these results. Social Identity Theory (SIT) 
postulates that individuals will favour ingroup members in order to improve the relative 
standing of the ingroup. This in turn improves the individuals own social identity (Turner & 
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Tajfel, 1986). Bounded generalized reciprocity postulates that individuals are adapted to 
cooperate with other individuals, particularly ingroup members, in order to maintain a good 
reputation so as not to be excluded from social exchange (Yamagishi & Kiyonati, 2000).      
Beyond intergroup dynamics, researchers have also shown that normative scripts and status 
influences the ways in which individuals distribute resources in the minimal group situation. 
Hertel and Kerr (2000) showed that individuals can be primed to promote equality rather 
than compete (Tajfel et al., 1971) with the outgroup. Rubin, Badea, Jetten (2014) showed 
that individuals of low status groups show compensatory ingroup favouritism or competitive 
in group favouritism deal with their low status. There is limited research regarding how 
these aspects influence levels of reciprocation. 
Aims and Rationale 
Much of the research regarding outcome interdependence and reciprocation has employed 
conventional methods of game theory (Balliet, Wu, & De Dreu, 2014).These methods are 
weak in that they are unrealistic and rigid. They are often dyadic in nature; this means that a 
generalized exchange context cannot be observed. A generalized exchange context refers to 
a context whereby a group of individuals are engaged in indirect exchange whereby 
cooperation is not necessarily reciprocated by the recipient of the cooperation, but may be  
reciprocated by other individuals (Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000). A generalized exchange 
context is important when assessing interdependencies amongst several individuals. The 
evolution of reciprocation is also difficult to assess with these dyadic methods do not allow 
for the sequential interaction of many individuals. 
The present study employed the Virtual Interaction Application (VIAPPL) to study 
reciprocation and its evolution in the minimal group situation. This software offers a more 
dynamic and realistic approach to studying reciprocation. 
The present study aimed to assess how intergroup dynamics, normative scripts, as well as 
status influence the levels of intergroup reciprocation in the minimal group situation. This 
study also further aimed to assess how reciprocation evolves in a generalized exchange 
context. 
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Study Objectives 
Previous research using traditional game theory has shown how group dynamics can 
influence reciprocation (Rabbie et al., 1989; Yamagishi et al., 1999) have shown that group 
dynamics can influence reciprocation, limited research has studied the influence of 
normative scripts and status on reciprocation. The study of reciprocation and its evolution 
has been limited by the methodologies used which do not allow for a truly generalized 
exchange. With the use of more complex methods, this study has the following objectives: 
1. To assess how group contexts influence the levels of ingroup and outgroup 
reciprocation, i.e. group-based reciprocation. This refers to reciprocation 
occurring between groups rather than between individuals.  
2. To assess how the priming of normative scripts (fairness and competition) 
influences the levels of ingroup and outgroup reciprocation. 
3. To assess how intergroup inequality influences the levels of reciprocation. 
4. To assess how the levels of reciprocation evolve over time 
5. To assess the interactional consequences of the above factors (group contexts, 
normative scripts, status) on the levels of reciprocation. 
6. To contribute to social psychological investigation a novel method (VIAPPL), that 
addresses some of the limitations of studying interactional dynamics in 
experiments.   
Research Questions 
The objectives of this study are to assess how the levels of group-based reciprocation are 
influenced by group contexts, normative scripts, and status. In line with this, the research 
questions of this study are:  
1. How do group dynamics influence the levels of ingroup and outgroup 
reciprocation? 
2. How does the priming of normative scripts (fairness and competition) influence 
the levels of ingroup and outgroup reciprocation? 
3. How does intergroup inequality influence the levels of intergroup reciprocation? 
4. How do the levels of intergroup reciprocation evolve over time 
5. How do the interactional consequences of the above factors (group contexts, 
normative scripts, status) influence the levels of intergroup reciprocation? 
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Definition of Terms 
Generalized Exchange Context: This study argues that the previous studies on outcome 
interdependence and reciprocation are limited because they do not provide a generalized 
exchange context. A generalized exchange context refers a “…type of social exchange 
system in which the rewards that an individual receives from others do not depend on the 
resources provided by that individual” (Cheshire, 2016, p. 1). The resources that an 
individual receives are related to how an individual has treated other individuals and not 
necessarily how they have treated the allocating individual. The resource allocation is also 
related to how the allocator has been treated by other individuals. Traditional methods do 
not allow for a generalized exchange since interactions in these games largely occur in 
dyads.  
Outcome Dependence/Interdependence: This refers to a situation where the outcomes of 
individuals who are interacting are intertwined (Yamgishi & Kiyonari, 2000). In this instance, 
the rewards that an individual receives are determined by other individuals and the 
individual determines the rewards that other individuals receive. This study argues that the 
outcome interdependence that develops when individuals interact in a generalized 
exchange context can influence reciprocation.  
The Minimal Group Paradigm: This is an approach for studying the minimal conditions 
required for discrimination to occur between groups (Tajfel et al., 1971). This study employs 
this paradigm in line with previous studies on outcome interdependence and reciprocation 
in order to partial out the influence of other factors on reciprocation, such as race and 
gender. 
Reciprocation/Reciprocity: Reciprocation refers to the act of responding to an action by 
making a corresponding act. This study is particularly focused on intergroup reciprocation.  
This study argues that the context of an interaction will influence the levels of ingroup and 
outgroup reciprocation. 
Intergroup Reciprocation/Group-based Reciprocation: This refers to reciprocation 
occurring between groups. This is in contrast to interindividual reciprocation which refers to 
reciprocation assessed at the levels of individuals. This study assessed how the levels of 
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intergroup reciprocation are influenced by group contexts, normative scripts, and status. If 
an individual gives to an ingroup member in round n, what is the likelihood that this 
individual will receive from the ingroup in round n + 1?    
Delimitation and Scope of Study 
This study is particularly focused on the levels of intergroup reciprocation and how they are 
influenced by different contexts (group context, norms, and status) as well as how they 
evolve over time. This study does not assess inter-individual reciprocation or other 
important aspects in the process of reciprocation, such as reputation and the consequences 
of non-reciprocation. 
Overview of Dissertation 
Chapter one offers a brief introduction to the study as well as the objectives and scope of 
the study. Chapter two provides a substantial argument for the need of this study. It 
discusses the early conceptualization of reciprocation and serves to problematize it as well 
as the methods used to study reciprocation. This section also discusses research on 
normative scripts and status and how these factors may influence reciprocation. Chapter 
three discusses the methodology employed in this study with particular reference to the 
research design, sampling, the reliability, the validity, ethical considerations, data collection, 
and the data analysis techniques employed in this study. Chapter four presents the results 
of the study. Chapter five discusses the results of the study in relation to the literature 
presented in chapter two. Chapter six summarizes the findings of the study and discusses 
their implications as well as their limitations.           
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Chapter 2 Review of 
Literature 
 
 
Trivers (1971) argued that social life contains numerous opportunities for self-interested 
individuals to cheat or to fail to reciprocate. Even in modern human societies, where 
infrastructures facilitate exchange between groups and individuals, the incentive to cheat in 
cooperative situations is “…probably the rule rather than the exception” (Fehr, Fischbacher, 
& Gächter, 2002, p. 1). There is thus a widespread belief that people will act selfishly in 
contexts of social and economic exchange, especially in the absence of overt regulation and 
surveillance.  
Despite this, many authors have argued that reciprocation is a common occurrence and a 
fundamental characteristic of human interaction. Becker (1956) viewed reciprocity as being 
so fundamental to human interaction that he referred to humans as Homo Reciprocuses. 
Hobhouse (as cited in Gouldner, 1960) asserted that reciprocity is the imperative attitude of 
society as well as the fundamental characteristic through which social stability is achieved. 
Thurnwald (1932) also advocated that reciprocity is pivotal to the functioning of societies. 
He saw reciprocity as an imperative that permeates every aspect life and as forming the 
foundation upon which all social and ethical life is founded. Simmel (as cited in Gouldner, 
1960) goes as far as to state that society as we know it could not exist without the give and 
take (reciprocity) evident in everyday life. 
This review of the literature will discuss some of the early conceptualizations of 
reciprocation, which argued that reciprocation is likely to occur in all situations either for 
utilitarian (Malinowski, 1960) or moral reasons (Gouldner, 1960).This conceptualization of 
reciprocation will then be problematized referring to literature that suggests that group 
dynamics (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000), norms (Pettigrew, 1958; 
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Gerard & Hoyt 1974; Hertel & Kerr, 2000), and intergroup status (Tajfel & Turner, 1985; Fehr 
& Schmidt, 1999; Rubin, Badea, & Jetten, 2014) can influence the way in which group-based 
reciprocation manifests itself. All of this will be done in the context of the work of Tajfel, 
Billing, Bundy, and Flament (1971), who in their minimal group studies, showed how the 
simple act of transforming a context (group context) can influence the distribution of 
resources. The workings of reputation in a generalized exchange context, where a group of 
individuals are engaged in indirect exchange, and how this may affect reciprocation and its 
evolution will also be discussed. Additionally, the methods employed to study 
interdependence and reciprocation in the minimal group situation will be problematized 
and the Virtual Interaction Application Platform (VIAPPL) will be offered as an alternative 
method.   
 
Principles of Reciprocity  
Malinowski (1932) developed several principles of reciprocity grounded in his 
anthropological work in so-called “primitive societies”. Malinowski (1932) asked why rules 
of interaction are followed when they are costly and tiresome? He disagreed with the claim 
that reciprocity arose simply due to the respect and reverence that “primitive people” had 
for traditional custom and authority. Instead, he viewed reciprocity as a more fundamental 
“social machinery” through which custom and authority are built. This cultural machinery 
operates through an evolving network of obligations that Malinowski argued would be 
evident in ritualistic deeds conducted by individuals and groups (e.g., paying a cow for 
impregnating a maiden in order to restore the lost pride of the maiden’s family). In 
Malinowski’s view, reciprocity refers to the intertwined status duties that individuals owe to 
one another. This is a situation whereby individuals partake in deeds that elevate the 
statuses of each other. He therefore views reciprocity as occurring within an established 
partnership and is related to fixed social ties. Malinowski further argued that reciprocity 
necessitates a mutual dependence of individuals, whereby there is a division of labour and 
individuals hold their end of bargain in order for the society to function. Based on this, 
Malinowski (1932) pointed out three assumptions under which individuals could be 
operating. These are that (a) in a prolonged interaction of individuals in the exchange of 
goods and services, the benefits accrued will balance out between the individuals; or (b) 
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when individuals do not reciprocate the positive actions of others towards them, they will 
experience negative consequences from other individuals; or (c) there is an expectation that 
those that they help will help them in the future. 
As Gouldner (1960) points out, Malinowski (1932) sees reciprocity as occurring as a result of 
its utilitarian value as well as the understanding of the consequences of non-reciprocation 
imposed by other individuals. Individuals reciprocate because they believe that they will 
accrue additional benefits from doing so as well as because of the fear of being ostracized 
by other individuals if they do not reciprocate. Gouldner (1960) agrees with these 
arguments, he however adds a third component that he believes explains reciprocity. In line 
with this, Gouldner (1960) argued that individuals may reciprocate, not only because of its 
utilitarian value or the fear of punishment, but they may also do so because of a shared 
moral norm. He further argues that there is a moral imperative for individuals to assist those 
who have assisted them and states that, “…beyond reciprocity as a pattern of exchange and 
beyond folk beliefs about reciprocity as a fact of life, there is another element: a generalized 
moral norm of reciprocity which defines certain actions and obligations as repayments for 
benefits received” (p. 170). As a result of this, Gouldner (1960) developed an argument of a 
norm of reciprocity. 
The Norm of Reciprocity 
Gouldner (1960) argues against cultural relativism and posits that the norm of reciprocity is 
universal, adding that the process of being grateful for or reciprocating a given benefit is 
everywhere and in most cases, a duty. He suggests that even though reciprocity may be a 
fact, the actual articulation of reciprocity may differ with time and place. Regardless, 
Gouldner (1960) argues that there are two universal and intertwined minimal demands that 
the norm of reciprocity makes on individuals. These are that individuals must assist those 
who have assisted them and that individuals must not harm those who have assisted them. 
Broadly speaking, the norm of reciprocity can be seen as a feature of all value systems and 
moral codes. Though reciprocity may be universal, Gouldner (1960) asserts that the 
application of reciprocity may differ according to the amount of benefits accrued. Gouldner 
(1960) argues that the value given to a benefit is based on various factors including the 
recipient's need when they received the benefit, the resources of the individuals who gave 
the benefit, and the reasons that are assumed for an individual’s giving.   
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Gouldner (1960) further argues that the norm of reciprocity is a substantive and distinct 
instrument that is crucial in maintaining stability in social systems. Why would the principles 
of reciprocity be insufficient in maintaining stability in social systems and Gouldner’s norm 
of reciprocity be necessary? Gouldner (1960) argued that a moral norm of reciprocity that 
goes beyond the utilitarian explanation of reciprocity proposed by Malinowski (1932) is 
necessary for maintaining social stability through reciprocity due to the, “…disruptive 
potentialities of power differences” (p. 174). He states that due to power differences 
amongst individuals inherent in society, powerful individuals might attempt to gain benefits 
without reciprocating them. This circumstance is ripe for the crumbling of reciprocity and 
the social systems it maintains. The norm of reciprocity, however, stimulates the need to 
repay benefits that have been incurred from other individuals even in a situation where the 
power dynamics at play could lead to the exploitation of certain individuals. The norm 
therefore, as Gouldner (1960, p. 174) attests, “…safeguards powerful people against the 
temptations of their own status; it motivates and regulates reciprocity as an exchange 
pattern, serving to inhibit the emergence of exploitative relations which would undermine 
the social system and the very power arrangements which had made exploitation possible”.  
Gouldner (1960) posits that it is not only through the repayment of obligations that social 
systems are maintained. This is apparent when we consider the fact that reciprocation may 
occur over an extended period of time. That obligations that have been incurred are not 
usually repaid immediately but are repaid after a period of time. The main reason why 
obligations that are to still be repaid maintain social systems, Gouldner (1960) argues, is 
because it is injudicious for those who are owed obligations to sever ties with those 
individuals who owe them obligations. This is because this exponentially decreases the 
chances of them getting repaid. It is also inadvisable for those who owe obligations to sever 
ties with those they owe because they will not be able to incur more favours without having 
repaid their debt or showing that they have no intentions of repaying the debts they owe by 
severing ties with their debtors. Added to this, under the norm of reciprocity, it is morally 
indecent to sever relations or initiate conflicts against people to whom an individual owes 
obligations. Another way in which reciprocity maintains social systems is related to the fact 
that a rough equivalence of the obligations owed are repaid. Obligations owed are not 
repaid in exact amounts but in rough amounts where the amounts owed and the amounts 
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paid are roughly the same. Gouldner (1960, p. 175) points out that, this results in “…a 
certain amount of ambiguity as to whether indebtedness has been repaid and, over time, 
generates uncertainty about who is in whose debt”. All this, however, is dependent on a 
mutual shared notion of the moral propriety of repayment, begotten by the norm of 
reciprocity. 
Group Dynamics and Fate Control 
The work of Thibaut and Kelley (1959) has pointed out that reciprocity may manifest itself 
differently in large groups due to the interdependence that may develop amongst group 
members. Thibaut and Kelley argued that there are different norms of reciprocity and 
interdependence that exist within groups that do not exist in a dyad of individuals who 
interact in larger society. While Malinowski (1932) and Gouldner (1960) hypothesized about 
the latter, Thibaut and Kelley (1959) discussed the former. These norms that exist within 
groups are present when: (1) there is a consensus amongst group members regarding 
actions that are deemed acceptable and unacceptable for group members, and (2) if social 
practices exist that ensure loyalty to what is required of group members. 
As the discussion moves from norms in a dyad to norms in large groups, the functional 
contributions of norms become more pronounced in maintaining group cohesion (Thibaut & 
Kelley, 1959). As the size of the groups increases, it becomes more difficult and costly to 
attain consensus amongst members of a group. Therefore, as Thibaut and Kelley (1959, p. 
239) pointed out, “…as groups become larger, it becomes increasingly important that 
regularized and dependable agreements supplant the informal process of attaining 
consensus ad hoc each time a new issue arises”. Additionally, as the number of people in a 
group increases, the interferences in response sets are also likely to increase. This may 
result in higher costs and lower gains for group members. With an increase in group size, a 
division of labour between group members arises. This additionally makes controlling the 
behaviour of group members more difficult and complex (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). The 
solution to this is the development of specialized and complex norms beneficial to members 
of the group and mechanisms to ensure that these norms are adhered to. These 
complexities that develop in the context of groups rather than dyads is a main reason why 
this study seeks to assess intergroup reciprocation in a generalized exchange contex rather 
than reciprocation in a dyad.    
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Thibaut and Kelley (1959) argued that, generally, group norms ensure that individuals act in 
ways in which they would not habitually act of their own accord. These are not then acts 
that an individual would perform because they are inherently valuable to them. But rather, 
ones that a group can only ensure by fate control over an individual (Thibaut & Kelley, 
1959). 
For instance, if a group is dependent on one of its members for the fulfilment of an activity 
(i.e. taking minutes at a meetings). This is not an activity that an individual would usually 
gain personal rewards from doing, but one from which the group derives rewards. If the 
group has fate control over the individual, (i.e. the other group members could deny the 
individual rewards or punish the individual) the group can ensure or make it more likely that 
an individual will take the minutes. Indeed, in Kelley and Thibaut's (1978) later work, 
regarding the interdependence of individuals, persons have multilateral fate control over 
each other, meaning that each subject can at least partially affect the outcomes of other 
subjects in the in a given situation regardless of the actions other individuals take. Kelley 
and Thibaut defined interdependence as, “the presence of fate control and/or behaviour 
control in each actor in a relationship” (as cited in Karp, Jin, Yamagishi, & Shinotsuka, 1993, 
p. 232). In this situation, members of the group are dependent on one another since they 
have fate control over one another in ways that non-members of the group do not have. 
Hence, the ways in which members of the group interact with non-members of the group 
may differ in some situations.     
Thibaut and Kelley (1959) argued that, in order for fate control to be effective in a group, (1) 
the expected behaviour of each individual in the group as well as the consequences of 
differing must be understood by the group members, (2) there must be surveillance by 
group members to ensure that other group members play their part, and (3) there must be 
ways of rewarding individuals for good behaviour and punishing them for indiscretions 
towards the group.                              
Much of the early conceptualizations of reciprocity, including Brazelton, Koslowski, and 
Main (1974); Patterson (1970); Goranson and Berkowitz (1966); and Altman (1973), have 
revolved around Malinowski’s (1932) and Gouldner’s (1960) argument about reciprocity as a 
universal concept that manifests itself in the same way in all contexts. That in all contexts, if 
an individual gives to another, the other individual will give back to the individual. Either 
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solely for utilitarian purposes, as Malinowski (1932); Goranson and Berkowitz (1966); and 
Goranson (1964) argue, or as a moral obligation, as Gouldner (1960) and Berndt (1977) 
argue. Although Gouldner (1960) concedes that the level of reciprocation may vary 
according to various factors; including the need of the receiver when they were given a 
benefit or the amount of resources the giver has at the time of giving, the point 
nevertheless still stands that if one receives, one will give. In contrast to this understanding 
of reciprocity as a universal phenomenon that manifests itself in the same way in all 
contexts; the work of Thibaut and Kelley (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959 as well as Kelley, Thibaut, 
Radloff, & Mundy, 1962) have served to problematize this understanding. Thibaut and 
Kelley (1959) pointed out, as discussed above, the ways in which interdependence amongst 
group members in group contexts can influence individuals. Evidence of the ways in which 
intragroup interdependence can influence the distribution of resources can be found in the 
work of Tajfel, Billing, Bundy, and Flament (1971) as well as in the criticisms of their 
explanations of the results (Rabbie, Schot, & Visser, 1989; Yamagish & Kiyonari, 2000).        
The Minimal Group Paradigm 
The minimal group paradigm was utilized by Tajfel et al. (1971) in order to circumvent the 
influence of factors that are not of interest to an experimenter. Tajfel et al. (1971) wanted 
to study whether just the separation of individuals into different groups without the 
influence of other factors, such as social history, can influence the giving patterns of 
individuals. In Tajfel’s et al. (1971) minimal group paradigm, the only difference between 
the groups was the fact that they believed they were grouped by a trivial category. Tajfel et 
al. (1971) used the individuals’ preference either for Klee or Kandinsky paintings. The aim of 
this paradigm was to prove that social categorization was sufficient to cause intergroup 
discrimination and ingroup favouritism. Diehl (1990) posits that the following conditions 
must be met in the minimal group paradigm. Firstly, the individuals should have no face-to-
face interaction, either between ingroup or outgroup members. Secondly, absolute 
anonymity of group membership must be maintained at all times. Third, there should be no 
instrumental or rational link between the criteria for intergroup context and the nature of 
ingroup and outgroup responses requested from the subjects. Fourth, individuals should not 
accrue any direct benefits from the decisions they make in the minimal group (though this 
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was challenged and changed by later researchers i.e. Yamagishi et al. (1999) and Rabbie, 
Schot, and Visser (1989) as will be discussed later.  
In Tajfel’s et al. (1971) experiments, participants were asked to assign rewards or penalties 
to other participants, either those from the ingroup or the outgroup. The outcomes of the 
experiment revealed that the way in which resources were allocated by the participants of 
all the groups resulted in ingroup favouritism and outgroup discrimination. A second 
experiment confirmed the results. Added to this, the second experiment also showed that 
participants not only favoured their own group, they often did this in a way that maximized 
the relative difference in resources between the groups and not necessarily in a way that 
maximized the actual resources of their group (Tajfel, as cited in Diehl, 1990). 
Tajfel et al. (1971, p. 176) summarized their finding as follows: 
“In conclusion, the crucial results of the study can be simply restated as follows: in a situation in which the Ss’ 
own interests were not involved in their decisions, in which alternative strategies were available that would 
maximize the total benefits to a group of boys who knew each other well, they acted in a way determined by 
an ad hoc intergroup context. We interpreted these results in terms of the functioning of a ‘generic’ social 
norm which was perceived by the Ss as relevant to the solution of a problem of social conduct with which they 
were confronted. There is ample evidence in the data that this was a deliberate strategy which applied even 
when Ss’ group getting more than the outgroup directly conflicted with simple ‘material’ gain for the ingroup”. 
The results of the above experiment illustrated that the simple act of introducing group 
dynamics can change the ways in which individuals interact, as Thibaut and Kelly (1959) 
suggested. Though Tajfel’s understanding of the results did not include intragroup 
interdependence but rather focused on social identity and norms. In later works, Tajfel 
(1972), elaborated on the reasons why he and his colleagues found the above results. He 
argued that individuals’ intergroup discrimination was an attempt to achieve a positive 
social identity for their ingroup. This concept was developed further in later works, including 
Tajfel (1974) and Turner (1975), and culminated in the formation of the Social Identity 
Theory (SIT) (Tajfel & Turner, 1985).  
Social Identity Theory (SIT) 
The SIT account of the results of the first minimal group experiment supposes that the 
ingroup bias that occurred was not only a cognitive process in which the participants tried to 
make sense of their environment, it was also a way of, “…defining one’s place in society” 
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(Diehl, 1990, p. 269). Tajfel and Turner (1985) argued that social groups define a person’s 
social identity and that this encourages individuals to compare the ingroup with the 
outgroup. In this instance, social identity refers to those facets of a person’s identity that 
he/she obtains from his/her membership to a group. By comparing the ingroup and the 
outgroup, individuals come to the conclusion that the ingroup is either equal to, of a higher 
status, or of a lower status than the outgroup. Tajfel and Turner (1985) argued that this 
conclusion contributes to an individual’s self-esteem. Therefore, if the ingroup is of a higher 
status than the outgroup, ingroup members have higher self-esteem. Based on this, Tajfel 
and Turner (1985) proposed three principles. Firstly, persons endeavour to realize and 
sustain a positive social identity. Second, a significant portion of social identity is grounded 
on positive appraisals of the ingroup against the outgroup. Third, if the appraisal of the 
ingroup puts it in a negative light, persons will either move to a more positively valued 
group or take actions that improve the value of their own group. This can be done either 
through individual mobility, where an individual moves to a group of a higher status or 
social creativity, where individuals redefine assessment criteria so they are in their favour.             
Besides intergroup context, Tajfel and Turner (1985) point out three other factors that are 
needed for intergroup differentiation. Firstly, members of groups need to have internalized 
their group membership as a part their self-concept. Secondly, an individual must have 
dynamics on which to evaluate groups. Thirdly, the outgroup must be a relevant comparison 
group, meaning that they must have comparison dimension compatible with the ingroup as 
well as be proximal to the ingroup. According to this viewpoint, minimal groups, “…are 
highly comparable groups which share a consensually valued comparison dimension 
(distribution of rewards). Because there is no possibility of individual mobility or social 
creativity for members of minimal groups, they are restricted to social competition in 
achieving intergroup differentiation” (Diehl, 1990, p. 270). The objective of this social 
competition is establishing a positive social identity so as to augment an individual’s self- 
esteem. In the minimal group context therefore, a positive social identity can only be 
achieved by allocating resources that leads to intergroup discrimination (Tajfel & Turner, 
1985).  
It should thus be expected from SIT that intergroup discrimination in the minimal group 
experiments should result in a rise in an individual’s self-esteem (Diehl, 1990). Indeed, 
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Oakes and Turner (1980) as well as Lemyre and Smith (1985) found that individuals who had 
discriminated in the minimal group paradigm had a higher self-esteem than individuals who 
did not discriminate. 
SIT does not in and of itself explain how intergroup dynamics can change the way in which 
reciprocation manifests itself. This has come from the research and arguments that have 
spawned as criticisms of the SIT explanation of the results of the minimal group experiment 
conducted by Tajfel et al. (1971). The criticisms that are particularly relevant with regards to 
the way in which intergroup dynamics fundamentally reshape the way in which 
reciprocation manifests itself are those that argue that in the minimal group experiment, 
group context is confounded with outcome dependence (Rabbie, Schot, & Visser, 1989; 
Gaertner & Insko, 2001; Yamagishi, Jin, & Kiyonari, 1999; and Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000). 
Individuals allocate resources to those individuals who will be able to reciprocate the 
gesture. 
Mutual Interdependence and Intergroup Dynamics 
Karp et al. (1993) argued that the ingroup bias evident in Tajfel’s et al. (1971) minimal group 
paradigm is an important finding for theories of intergroup relations. However, as stated 
earlier, Tajfel’s interpretation of the findings was contentious. Yamagishi and Kiyonari (2000, 
p. 117) point out that, in Tajfel’s et al. (1971) minimal group experiment, there is “…a 
residue of interdependence existing in the form of mutual or multilateral fate control”. This 
observation is grounded on the recognition that the minimal group situation is not as 
minimal as was first thought. The minimal group situation was thought to be void of an 
interdependence of the participants’ interests. The reality, according to Yamagishi and 
Kiyonari (2000), was that one’s actions affected other participants’ actions and that the 
actions of other participants indirectly affect one’s interests. This is what Thibaut and Kelley 
(as cited in Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000) referred to as mutual behaviour control. Thibaut 
and Kelley (1959) pointed out that interdependence amongst ingroup members can arise if 
there is a mutual fate control amongst ingroup members. This was assumed not to be the 
case in the minimal group situation. However, the payments that participants received in 
Tajfel’s minimal group experiments were actually reliant on the actions of other 
participants. In arguing that the way in which participants in minimal group experiment 
apportion rewards amongst ingroup and outgroup members had no utilitarian consequence 
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to the allocator, Tajfel et al. (1971) missed the fact that the rewards that an the allocator 
gets are also determined by the would be recipients. As Yamagishi and Kiyonari (2000, p. 
117) point out, “they allocate money and, at the same time, others allocate money to 
them”. The outcomes of participants are therefore dependent on other participants.   
Interdependence of individuals was first posited as the cause for ingroup bias in the minimal 
group paradigm by Rabbie et al. (1989). They argued that, as a result of the interdependent 
nature of reward allocation, individuals could expect more favours from their fellow group 
members by giving them favours. Specifically, they posit that individuals in the minimal 
group situation favour members of their own group assuming that the ingroup members will 
reciprocate the favour. Hence, even though individuals in Tajfel’s et al. (1971) minimal group 
paradigm are not able to directly allocate resources to themselves, they can do so indirectly, 
on their rational supposition that other ingroup members will reciprocate their favour. By 
being more generous to the ingroup as opposed to the outgroup, they would boost their 
chances of maximizing their own outcomes. Thus, Rabbie et al. (1989) argue that there is a 
rational connection between economic self-interests and the tactic of ingroup favouritism in 
the minimal group paradigm. 
Rabbie et al. (1989) hypothesized that the higher the supposed interdependence of 
outcomes on the ingroup, the higher the ingroup favouritism that will be witnessed. 
Likewise, the higher the alleged outcome interdependence on the outgroup, the greater the 
amount of outgroup favouritism that will occur. In their experiment assessing this 
hypothesis they utilised the minimal group design with a few adjustments. One of these was 
an experiment condition in which individuals made allocations to both ingroup and 
outgroup members, and their own outcomes were dependent upon both groups. In a 
second condition, individuals made allocations to both groups but only relied on the ingroup 
for their own rewards. In a third condition, individuals only relied on the outgroup for their 
own rewards. When individuals’ outcomes were reliant on the ingroup, ingroup favouritism 
was highest, and when outcomes were dependant on the outgroup only, outgroup 
favouritism resulted.  
The expectations of participants the minimal group situation has also been investigated. 
Yamagishi et al. (1999) demonstrated that ingroup favouritism was higher amongst 
individuals who expected more favours from ingroup members. This demonstrates that 
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individuals do not unreservedly favour ingroup members just because they are ingroup 
members, as SIT suggests. Rather, individuals are more favourable to ingroup members only 
in situations where they anticipate that ingroup members will treat them favourably in 
return. As Thibaut and Kelley (1959) argued, individuals are likely to favour ingroup 
members when there is mutual fate control amongst the ingroup members, i.e. 
interdependence. These later findings in the minimal group situation have shown that 
ingroup favouritism is not as a result of identity strengthening as Yamagishi and Kiyonari 
(2000, p. 118) point out, “…if that were the case, participants should have treated ingroup 
members favourably even when they did not expect similar favourable treatment from 
them”. Researchers such as Yamagishi et al. (1999) and Rabbie et al. (1989) have argued 
that it is rather reciprocation at work, where individuals favour those who they expect to 
favour them. 
Within the argument that reciprocation is at play within the minimal group situation, there 
are differing perspectives on how it is at play. Reciprocation is either argued to be 
unbounded (Rabbie et al., 1989) or bounded (Yamagishi et al., 1999). Unbounded reciprocity 
represents the earliest conceptualization of reciprocity within the minimal group situation. 
The argument for unbounded reciprocity, proposed by Rabbie et al. (1989), posits that 
individuals will cooperate with an individual that can reciprocate their kindness regardless of 
group affiliation. This was evidenced in their work discussed above. 
 Yamagishi et al. (1999) on the other hand, illustrated that when individuals are equally 
dependant on ingroup and outgroup members, they are likely to favour the ingroup. This led 
Yamagishi et al. (1999) to argue that reciprocity is bounded, meaning that individuals favour 
those who favour them or those they expect to favour them, but that individuals prefer to 
reciprocate within the ingroup. This realization led Yamagishi et al. (1999) to develop the 
theory of Bounded Generalized Reciprocity (BGR). 
BGR is based on an evolutionary perspective on social cooperation, proposed by Axelrod & 
Hamilton; Bowles and Gintis; Darwin; Henrich and Henrich; Trivers; Wilson (as cited in 
Balliet, Wu, and Dreu, 2014). BGR argues that groups played a fundamental role in the 
reproduction and survival of individuals. Additionally, BGR argues that groups offer 
individuals a vessel for a generalized exchange network. Meaning that groups contain a 
system of indirect reciprocity in which people act in ways that sustain a positive reputation. 
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This is because individuals are more likely to cooperate with other individuals who have a 
reputation of cooperating and are less likely to cooperate with individuals who have a 
reputation of not cooperating. Therefore, individuals need to sustain a reputation of a 
reliable co-operator with the ingroup so that they are not excluded from the generalized 
exchange network by other ingroup members. BGR states that individuals evolved,  
“(a) to have depersonalized and generalized trust that other ingroup members will 
cooperate,  
(b) to be motivated to establish and maintain a cooperative reputation among ingroup 
members, and  
(c) to expect to receive benefits from other ingroup members, but not necessarily from the 
same ingroup members they cooperated with or helped” (Balliet, Wu, & Dreu, 2014, p. 
1559).  
Prompts of group membership are argued to strengthen trust, reputational concerns, and 
cooperation, even when there is no clear outgroup and when there is no possibility for 
direct reciprocity from an individual’s present interaction partner. Therefore, BGR posits 
that as a result of generalized trust in ingroup members and wanting to construct a positive 
reputation within the ingroup, individuals cooperate with ingroup members more than with 
outgroup members and unclassified strangers (Mifune, Hashimoto, & Yamagishi, 2010; 
Yamagishi et al., 1999). Indeed, Stroebe, Lodewijkx, and Spears (2005); Gaertner and Insko 
(2000); and Yamagishi et al. (1999) found that individuals tend to favour ingroup members, 
particularly when there is a possibility that they could reciprocate.           
Though both SIT and BGR argue that ingroup favouritism will occur, SIT posits that this will 
occur in order to sustain or formulate a positive social identity. BGR argues that ingroup 
favouritism occurs for utilitarian purposes and is conditional. Meaning that individuals who 
do not contribute to the generalized exchange of the ingroup are likely to be excluded from 
the generalized exchange. Individuals will also not favour ingroup members when there is 
no possibility of generalized exchange, for instance in Rabbie’s et al. (1989) study where 
individuals’ outcomes are solely reliant on the outgroup. BGR offers the best argument for 
the way in which reciprocity manifests itself fundamentally changes as a result of intergroup 
dynamics. Individuals favour ingroup members, therefore, reciprocation as a universal 
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phenomenon, as argued by Gouldner (1960) and Malinowski (1932), is limited. In intergroup 
dynamics, this attitude becomes nucleated within the group. One of the aims of this study is 
to ascertain how group dynamics influence the level of inter- and intragroup reciprocation.   
Normative Scripts  
An alternative explanation of the results of the original minimal group experiments was that 
the intergroup dynamics of the minimal group experiments induced a generic norm of 
cooperation among group members (Berkowitz 1994; Gerard and Hoyt 1974). Ground-
breaking work by Pettigrew (1958) uncovered the importance of social norms in 
inducing prejudiced attitudes, casting doubt over earlier psychodynamic and 
individualistic accounts of intergroup discrimination. Building on this, Hertel and Kerr 
(2000) point out that Tajfel’s (1970) original explanation of the minimal group experiments 
was that of a generic norm of cooperation. The argument of a generic norm of cooperation 
postulates that individuals may favour members of the ingroup merely due to the fact that it 
is a social norm, which refers to, “a social script prescribing favouritism or loyalty to one’s 
group as an expected and socially approved behaviour” (Hertel & Kerr, 2000, p. 317). Hertel 
and Kerr (2000) argue that normative social scripts are learnt through social interactions in 
intergroup dynamics where group loyalty is compensated in numerous ways. This is 
particularly true in situations that are ambiguous, such as the minimal group situation, 
where there are limited contextual signals to aid people in decision making. In this instance, 
individuals may not necessarily base their decisions of self-interest, as Rabbie et al. (1989) 
and Yamagishi et al. (1999) suggest, but rather, may defer to normative scripts that have 
been rewarded in previous interactions, and may therefore reciprocate within their own 
group (Hertel & Kerr, 2000). 
Added to its proposed explanation of ingroup favouritism in the minimal group situation, 
Hertel and Kerr (2000) argue that the normative scripts perspective could also identify 
circumstances under which individuals will not show ingroup favouritism or will show even 
greater ingroup favouritism. Loyalty to the ingroup is one of many potential normative 
scripts that could be triggered in the minimal group situation. The norm of equality could be 
triggered. As Messick and Schell (1992) point out, the norm of equality is highly socially 
acceptable in society and can therefore be stored in individuals’ cognition and retrieved 
from memory in the same way that the ingroup loyalty script can. The type of normative 
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script that is retrieved depends on the context in which an interaction is occurring. It is 
argued that different cues have the ability to trigger (or prime) different normative scripts 
and therefore affect the levels of ingroup and outgroup favouritism in the minimal group 
situation (Hertel & Kerr, 2000).  
Indeed, it is possible that the type of normative script primed through experimental 
procedures in the minimal group situation not only affects the resource allocation 
inclinations of individuals, it can also influence, “the subjective consequences of allocation 
behaviour” (Hertel & Kerr, p. 317). Here, the self-esteem increase seen after intergroup bias 
in Tajfel’s et al. (1971) minimal group experiment is argued to occur as a result of the 
research procedures that prime ingroup loyalty. In these circumstances, individuals who 
show ingroup favouritism are doing what they feel they are expected to do, i.e. be loyal to 
the ingroup, and will therefore have an increase in self-esteem. This increase in self-esteem 
is not based on positive identification, as SIT suggests, bit is rather due the satisfaction that 
individuals feel as a result of doing what the norms of the situation expected them to do. 
This argument suggests that if another norm, the norm of equality for instance, is primed 
over the norm of group loyalty, individuals’ actions will have a different impact on 
individuals’ self-esteem. Indeed Vickers (as cited in Hertel & Kerr, 2000) found that when 
the norm of equality was primed in the minimal group situation, individuals were more 
likely to distribute resources equally. Those that did, showed an increase in self- esteem 
while those that still showed ingroup favouritism had a decrease in self-esteem. Hertel and 
Kerr (2000) found similar results, additionally illustrating that as the primed norm changed, 
so did individuals’ perceptions of how other individuals expected them to act. Therefore, 
when the norm of group loyalty was primed, individuals felt that other individuals expected 
them to favour the ingroup whereas when the norm of equality was primed, individuals felt 
that other individuals expected them to distribute resources to relatively deprived 
individuals.  
If it is to be taken that group context produces a norm of ingroup cooperation and 
Yamagishi et al. (1999) argues that in this context individuals, individuals reciprocate to 
ingroup members to maintain a good reputation amongst ingroup members. This study 
seeks to ascertain whether or not the level of ingroup and outgroup reciprocation change 
when norms are changed, this study will implement norms of competition and fairness.  
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Relative Status  
The relative status of individuals has also been posited to effect the distribution of resources 
in individual and group contexts where there is an interdependence of individuals. As stated 
earlier, SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) posits that inequality between groups will enhance or 
maintain positive feelings about being a member of the high-status group. Alternatively, as a 
result of social comparison, members of the lower status group understand the comparative 
superiority of a higher status group; their relative standing is likely to negatively affect their 
social identity. In this instance, positive group distinctiveness may be achieved by means of 
direct competition with the higher status out-group. The low-status group as a whole may 
adopt a strategy in which they collectively mobilize to improve their status versus the high-
status group. SIT posits that members of the high status group will in turn cooperate 
amongst each other in order to maintain their positive distinctiveness. More specifically, a 
low status group will mobilize to improve their status by maintaining resources within the 
group through ingroup favouritism particularly when status is illegitimate and unstable, such 
as in this study. Alternatively, in situations where status is seen as stable and legitimate, 
low-status groups show outgroup favouritism. Rubin and Hewstone (as cited in Rubin et al., 
2014) theorize the outgroup favouritism of high status groups by low status groups as 
consensual discrimination as it indicates consensual views of intergroup status that are 
believed by individuals of both the high and low status groups. On the other hand, Jost, 
Banaji, and Nosek, (2004) argue that the outgroup favouritism shown by low status groups is 
a more active attempt to justify the intergroup status system.          
Additionally, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) argue that individuals may be inequity averse and this 
may affect how they reciprocate. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) state that an individual is inequity 
averse when they are opposed to circumstances that are seen as inequitable. They further 
state that individuals use various criteria in real life circumstances to decide what is 
inequitable. In game theory, individuals will base this on the number tokens that individuals 
have since this is the most prominent resource. Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman 
(1989) have also shown that individuals show a strong and vigorous aversion towards 
disadvantageous inequality when an individual’s own resources are lower when compared 
to other individuals. Many individuals also have an aversion towards advantageous 
inequality; this however, is less robust than the aversion to disadvantageous inequality. 
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Inequity aversion theory posits that ingroup members of the disadvantaged group will 
practice ingroup favouritism to ensure parity amongst the groups. Members of the high 
status group may also show outgroup favouritism in order to promote intergroup parity.  
The research of Rubin, Badea, and Jetten (2014) has produced evidence supporting both 
perspectives, SIT and inequity aversion. Rubin et al. (2014) found that members of low 
status groups generally utilized two strategies to get over the inequity, compensatory 
ingroup favouritism and competitive ingroup favouritism. Rubin et al. (2014) thus argued 
that it is conceivable groups of lower status can employ ingroup favouritism in two different 
ways and for two different reasons. Ingroup favouritism was employed to compete with an 
outgroup of a higher status so as to achieve positive ingroup distinctiveness. Rubin et al. call 
this approach competitive ingroup favouritism. Ingroup favouritism was also employed to 
compensate the ingroup for its low status so as to realize intergroup fairness. They call this 
approach compensatory ingroup favouritism. Therefore, competitive favouritism raises a 
low status group to a level better than that of the outgroup, while compensatory ingroup 
favouritism raises a group of a low status to a level that is the same as the out-group. More 
recent evidence from a study employing similar methods to the present study (Durrheim et 
al., 2016)  offered support for compensatory ingroup favouritism and found that in the 
context of illegitimate intergroup inequality, such as in this study, the low status group 
showed ingroup favouritism and that compensatory outgroup favouritism was seen from 
the high status group. Additionally, the study also found that ingroup favouritism from low 
status group and outgroup favouritism from high status group decreased as time progressed 
and the groups became more equal.      
Yamagishi et al. (1999) as well as Hertal and Kerr (2000) have shown that a change of 
context can influence norms of cooperation, this study seeks to assess the norms of 
reciprocation that will develop in the context of illegitimate intergroup inequality. Will 
individuals reciprocate in ways that promote intergroup equality as previous studies 
suggest? 
Reputational Concerns and the Evolution of Reciprocation 
A main reason why this study believes that individuals will act according to the prevailing 
reciprocal norms and that individuals who do not act according to this expectation will be 
ostracized, that they will be altruistically punished, is that individuals have been shown in 
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various circumstances, particularly when they are being observed, to be motivated to 
develop and maintain a good reputation (See Brandt, Hauert, & Sigmund, 2003). The 
importance of reputation in the development of social networks was discussed earlier in 
relation to Yamagishi’s et al. (1999) theory of Bounded Generalized Reciprocity. Further 
elaboration is needed here if we are to assess the evolution of reciprocation over a 
considerable period of time in particular.   
In evolutionary models, reputation is one of many signs that signals the way in which an 
individual is likely to act in social interactions. These signs could relate to various facets of 
behaviour, such as skill or dominance (Tennie, Frith, & Frith, 2010). This study however, 
focuses on behaviour in reciprocal interactions, and on reputation as an indication of the 
level of cooperativeness and willingness to reciprocate in various types of interactions, such 
as intergroup interactions, interactions amongst unequal groups as well as groups, and 
under various normative scripts. In these contexts, Tennie et al. (2010) and Yamagishi et al. 
(1999) argue that reputation plays a fundamental part in sustaining social cohesion. It 
provides incentive tools that reduce uncooperative behaviour, behaviour that goes against 
the expected and prevailing behaviour within the group, and influences the decisions of 
individuals in these social interactions.  
Tennie et al. (2010) argue that investigating the management of reputation is especially 
relevant in a large number of individuals, whereby the large size of the interacting groups 
increases anonymity, reducing the ability to monitor reputation. This becomes important 
when it is considered, as Tennie et al. (2010) and Yamagishi et al. (1999) argue, the fact that 
the benefits accrued from giving are not immediate is a central characteristic of reciprocity. 
In a reciprocal interaction, a person performs an act that is beneficial for another person, 
whilst sustaining an expense on themselves with the understanding that they will benefit in 
the long term. This behaviour could be seen as a type of altruism in the short-term.  
The challenge for evolutionary theories is to explain how such cooperative behaviour can 
evolve. Indirect reciprocity theory argues that cooperative persons benefit in the long run 
through increased cooperation from others. Here, the pricey initial act is an investment, as it 
is expected that it will be repaid at a later date (Tennie et al., 2010). In this situation, 
“…reputation is needed to establish cooperation. Uncooperative behaviour results in a bad 
reputation, which is associated with several disadvantages. As a result, reputation is a 
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stabilising factor, reducing the likelihood of uncooperative behaviour” (Tennie et al., 2010, 
p. 3). As discussed earlier, individuals decide the “…the subjective consequences of 
allocation behaviour” based on the context of their interaction (Hertel & Kerr, p. 317). For 
instance, if an individual is in an intergroup context, based on previous experience they may 
decide that they will be punished by the ingroup if they favour the outgroup. In this way, 
individuals decide what behaviour will result in them seeming cooperative.  
In individuals displaying reciprocal behaviour, it is probable that there are at least two 
mechanisms of reputation and reputation management, a mechanism that offers a 
foundation for choosing appropriate partners and another mechanism that provides a 
foundation for rewarding cooperative individuals. Therefore, persons who have acquired a 
reputation for cooperative behaviour are more likely to be chosen as partners (Sylwester, & 
Roberts, 2010), while individuals with a bad reputation are more likely to be ignored and 
excluded. These mechanisms provide strong motivation to be cooperative, even for 
individuals with a natural tendency to be uncooperative (Tennie et al., 2011). 
Direct examinations of cooperative behaviour or of the signs of this behaviour are a key 
source for verifying an individual’s reputation. The ‘audience effect’ hints that the person 
that is under scrutiny automatically account for individuals in the environment who are 
potential partners of the future. Social animals, who invest in others, send out signs 
favourable to them by cooperating with other individuals, but will not do so when 
unobserved. These signs come at a cost in the short term, and as the cost rises, so should 
the level of the enhancement of the reputation. Expensive reputation boosting actions tend 
to happen in the case where there are a number observers are present who not only can 
take note of the behaviour, but can also reward the behaviour at some point. Similarly, 
reputation-harming actions, for example, individuals who are uncooperative are more likely 
to be punished by other individuals. It is therefore not surprising that this behaviour, that is 
reputation harming, is more popular amongst individuals when no audience is present or 
there is anonymity (Tennie et al., 2011). Thus Tennie et al. (2011, p. 3) argue that, “The 
audience effect and effects of anonymity are two sides of the same coin, working in 
opposite directions. When there is anonymity, and this is often the case with large groups, it 
is hard to track individual reputation, and free riders can invade more easily. Removing 
anonymity and reinstating an audience will allow reputation to be acquired again, and will 
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lead to increases in cooperation”. Reciprocation will evolve in a way that allows individuals 
to maintain a good reputation.  
Punishment  
The propensity of individuals to act in ways that maintain a good reputation hinges on other 
individuals’ willingness to punish them if they don’t. Gintis (2000) argues that a significant 
number of individuals have a tendency to punish other individuals who fail to cooperate in a 
social dilemma even at a cost to themselves in the short term. The basis of this behaviour 
could be because individuals believe in reciprocating harm for harm, with little regard for 
the implications that may have for their own gains. An individual may thus engage in 
altruistic punishment because they are inequality-averse, meaning they are willing to punish 
individuals who do not cooperate in order to create a more equal allocation of resources 
and outcomes even if this may result in lower resources or outcomes for themselves and 
others. Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze (1982) illustrated the propensity that individuals 
have to punish individuals who do not cooperate. In their experiment, two participants were 
involved; one of them was given $10. This participant, referred to as the Proposer, was told 
to offer any number of dollars, from $1 to $10, to the other participant, referred to as the 
Responder. The Proposer is only allowed to make one proposal and the Responder can 
either accept or reject this offer. If the offer is accepted by the responder, the funds were 
split per the proposer’s wishes. However, if the Responder rejects the offer, the two 
participants both receive nothing. The participants do not interact again. The Responder 
often rejected low offers in order to punish the Proposer, even though this cost them 
resources. The results also showed that Proposers were less likely to offer low amounts, 
which may signal an understanding that other individuals are willing to punish selfish 
behaviour. In a variation of the game where a rejection by the Responder leads to them 
receiving nothing but the Proposers keeping their share, the Proposers offered significantly 
lower sums of money. Additionally, when individuals had played the game, they were 
questioned regarding their reasons for making offers that were acceptable to the receiving 
participants, Proposers frequently stated that they were fearful that the receiving 
participants would reject an offer that they felt was unacceptable and they, the Proposer, 
would receive nothing. When the receiving participants rejected offers, they often stated 
that they wanted to punish unacceptable behaviour (Gintis, 2000).   
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Third person altruistic punishment has also been observed. It has been shown that persons 
are prepared to confer favours on individuals who conform to what is expected of them in 
social interactions, as well as punish individuals who do not, even in situations where they 
are not personally assisted or harmed by the person’s acts. In everyday life, third party 
individuals who are not the recipients of another person’s pro-social act, assist the person in 
times of need, preferentially exchange favours with the person in ways that may be costly to 
the giver. Likewise, third party individuals who have not, themselves, been harmed by the 
behaviour of a person, may decline to assist even when it is not costly to do so, shun the 
reprobate, and approve of the offender’s ostracism from beneficial group activities, again at 
low cost to the third party but at high cost to the offender (Gitis, 2000). Shinada, Yamagishi, 
and Ohmuda (2004) also found that third party individuals are even more likely to punish 
ingroup members who do not favour other ingroup members in the dictator game. Jordan, 
McAuliffe, and Warneken (2014) found similar results.  
The propensity of individuals to punish other individuals if they do not act how they are 
expected to act (i.e. based on their reputation) has the ability to influence reciprocation 
now and in the future. If individuals know what is expected of them they will act in that way 
so that they do not get punished. If, however, individuals change their behaviour and go 
against what is expected of them, reciprocation will also change. This therefore results in 
the evolution of reciprocation when interaction occurs over time. This study argues that as 
individual become surer of what is expected of them through reinforcement, the norms that 
develop will become stronger (i.e. ingroup or outgroup reciprocation will strengthen) as 
individual will prescribe more to the behaviour that is reinforced.  
The propensity of norms to develop through individuals’ beliefs about what is expected of 
them and the punishment or rewarding of individuals based on reputation has been shown 
to be present in various contexts. There is, however, some evidence suggesting that some 
norms are more likely to develop than others. Feldman (1984) argued that in intergroup 
contexts, those norms that are of a utilitarian value to the ingroup re most likely to develop. 
Feldman (1984, p. 48) stated that “…a group will enforce norms that facilitate its very 
survival”. The enforcement of norms that are beneficial to the ingroup are also enforced 
more strongly than other norms. Therefore, individuals are more likely to be punished or 
rewarded for deviating or adhering to these norms (Feldman, 1984). 
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In addition to being beneficial to the individual, building a good reputation amongst ingroup 
members and thus increasing the likelihood of future ingroup favour (Yamagishi et al., 
1999), ingroup favouritism and reciprocation is also beneficial to the ingroup because it 
maintains the resources within the group. The norm of ingroup reciprocation is more 
beneficial to the ingroup than the norm of fairness and equality (as these require more 
reciprocation to the outgroup) and therefore more likely to develop. This study will seek to 
examine whether the evolution of reciprocation is also influenced by how beneficial it is to 
the ingroup.               
Martin Nowak and Karl Sigmund have been the most prominent scholars to study the 
evolution of reciprocation with the use of game theory (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; Nowak & 
Sigmund, 1998a; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998b; Ohtsuki, Iwasa, & Nowak, 2009; Nowak, 2006; 
and Brandt, & Sigmund, 2006), particularly with evolutionary game theory. Evolutionary 
game theory refers to the use of game theory to study the evolution of reciprocation and 
other forms of interdependence. Nowak and Sigmund (1998a) built on the work of Trivers 
(1971) and Axelrod and Hamilton (1981). In his seminal work, Trivers (1971) suggested 
reciprocal altruism (or direct reciprocity) that stimulates cooperation among a dyad of 
individuals interacting repeatedly. This thinking was solidified in the repeated prisoner’s 
dilemma game conducted by Axelrod and Hamilton (1981). In the work of Nowak and 
Sigmund, an evolutionary stable tit-for-tat strategy was found. Meaning that individuals 
reciprocated to cooperative individuals throughout the game. The work of Axelrod and 
Hamilton (1981) is an example of the study of the evolution of direct reciprocity. In contrast, 
indirect reciprocity explains cooperation even in situations where the same dyad of 
individuals are not interaction repeatedly. Nowak and Sigmund (1998a) argued that, with 
the help other individuals’ reputation, an individual comes to understand who they should 
or should not cooperate with. The logic is if non-co-operators are effectively excluded by 
this method, cooperation can be strengthened. Nowak and Sigmund (1998a) investigated 
the evolution of indirect reciprocity with the use of the concept of image scores. An image 
score is “…a binary illustration of an individual’s social reputation and is either good or bad” 
(Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2006). In their experiments (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998a), individuals had 
one shot interactions over several rounds with randomly selected individuals in each round. 
If an individual gave help to others, their image score increased, becoming positive. 
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Inversely, not helping resulted in a bad image score for the individual. Under this updating 
rule, Nowak and Sigmund found that what they called the discriminator strategy, where 
individuals give help to those individuals with good reputation and punish those with poor 
reputations, was most prominent. Much of the recent research on the evolution of 
reciprocation has relied on mathematical modelling (Roberts, 2015; Ghang & Nowak, 2015; 
van Doorn, & Taborsky, 2012; and Voelkl, 2015) due to the limitations of conventional 
methods of studying reciprocation and its evolution, which are discussed below. These 
mathematically modelled studies have generally found stronger levels of cooperation 
compared to those of Nowak and Sigmund (1998a), suggesting that the limitations discussed 
below matter. For instance Roberts (2015) found that a more realistic model resulted in 
individuals cooperating 96.07 % of the time compared to only 52.46 % of the time when the 
methods of Nowak and Sigmund were used. These findings emphasize the importance of 
more realistic methods of social psychological experiments (such as those discussed below, 
see viappl.org). Additionally, these evolutionary studies and models have largely focused on 
the evolution of inter-individual reciprocation. In light of the work of Thibaut and Kelley 
(1959) as well as Yamagishi et al. (1999), which was discussed earlier and which illustrated 
how the formation of groups can reformulate the dynamics of reciprocation, this study 
seeks to assess the evolution of group-based reciprocation in intergroup contexts, under 
various normative scripts, and under unequal groups.     
Game Theory and the Study of Interdependence and Reciprocation 
Game theory is, "…the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between 
intelligent rational decision-makers" (Myerson, 1991, p. 1). Evolutionary game theory refers 
to game theory employed to study the evolution of these phenomena (see Nowak & 
Sigmund, 1998a and Nowak & Sigmund, 1998b). Game theory is usually employed in 
psychology, economics, and political science to study rational decision-making. In recent 
times, various forms of game theory have been used to study reciprocation and its 
evolution, ingroup favouritism, and interdependence in the minimal group situation. Balliet, 
Wu, and De Dreu (2014) offer a succinct review of these methods.  
One of these is the dictator game; this is a game where there is a dictator and a recipient 
playing. A dictator is given a certain amount of money and then they are meant give some 
or all of to a recipient. In this case, the recipient does not have any influence on the 
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dictator’s decision. Thus, it would be in the self-interest of the dictator would be to keep all 
the money. The dictator either gives money to an ingroup or outgroup member and is 
sometimes played sequentially interchanging roles to assess indirect reciprocity (Balliet, Wu, 
& De Dreu, 2014).  
The trust game is also used. In this case, individuals are either an investor or a trustee. Here, 
the investor invests a certain amount of money by giving it to the trustee, this money is then 
tripled by the experimenter. The trustee decides how much of the money they return to the 
investor. The investor needs to decide how much risk to take (i.e. how much money to 
invest) as the trustee can either be selfish and keep all the money or be generous and give a 
significant portion of it back.  Individuals either play with ingroup or outgroup members.  
Social dilemma games such as the prisoner’s dilemma game, public goods dilemmas, and 
resource dilemmas have also been used. For instance, in the prisoner’s dilemma game, two 
individuals simultaneously decide how much of their endowment (e.g., 10 euros) to give to 
their partner. Because any amount provided to their partner is doubled, both individuals 
would be better off if both decided to cooperate, rather than not. However, similar to the 
dictator game, there is the greedy temptation to keep one’s endowment. As in the trust 
game, there is the fear that one’s cooperation may be exploited by a greedy partner. In the 
study of the evolution of phenomena, such as reciprocation, these games are played 
sequentially. Much of the literature regarding reciprocation, reputation, and punishment 
has focused on ingroup favouritism (Yamagishi et al., 2012). This study seeks to assess the 
influence of group dynamics as well as various normative scripts and inequality on 
reciprocation and its evolution over time. 
A concern with employing traditional methods of game theory in studying reciprocation and 
its evolution is that the assumptions made in these games differ significantly from “…the 
observed structure of real interactions” (van Doorn & Taborsky, 2012, p. 1). For instance, 
individuals are typically not limited to interacting repetitively with the same partner, nor do 
their societal exchanges happen at random (Whitehead, 2008; van Doorn & Taborsky, 2012) 
as they have been depicted in studies employing traditional methods of game theory and 
evolutionary game theory (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998a; Nowak & 
Sigmund, 1998b; Ohtsuki, Iwasa, & Nowak, 2009; Nowak, 2006; and Brandt & Sigmund, 
2006). These games are dyadic in nature and do not allow for a generalized interaction. 
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Generalized reciprocity and reputation cannot be observed in this situation as group of 
individuals cannot effectively observe the actions of other individuals and form opinions 
regarding those individuals’ reputations as well as have the opportunity to react accordingly. 
The image scoring method of Nowak and Sigmund (1998a) discussed earlier addresses some 
of these concerns in that it offers a tangible reputational reference based on previous 
actions for each partner an individual interacts with. The limits of this method is that an 
individual cannot directly observe the actions of other individuals and more importantly, an 
individual does not choose their partner since they are assigned randomly in each round. 
Ultimately this method is also limited in that it does not allow for a generalized exchange 
whereby an individual can directly observe the actions of other individuals in a generalized 
context and make decisions on whom to interact with over time (or rounds). Even more 
recent studies on the evolution of cooperation are limited in this regard. For instance, in a 
study on the evolution of cooperation (Dorrough, Glöckner, Hellmann, & Ebert, 2015) 
participants interacted sequentially with 10 outgroup members and then 10 ingroup 
members. This study like previous studies does not offer a generalized exchange context 
where individuals can view the actions of other individuals and make decisions on whom to 
interact with based on this or partner choice, where individuals can choose who to interact 
with. This study seeks to offer a platform that allows for this type of interaction.    
The Virtual Interaction Application (VIAPPL)  
This study employed VIAPPL (see viappl.org), which is an experimental software platform in 
which the interactional aspects of social life can be realistically assessed in intergroup 
dynamics (Durrheim et al., 2016). Since social interaction is the foundation of social life this 
platform allows researchers to test a wide range of social and psychological hypotheses. It 
allows for the study of evolving social interaction, such as reciprocation. As discussed above, 
this is often not the case in minimal group situation experiments. In this platform, variables 
such as group membership, amount of resources, or ties between individuals can be 
manipulated. Figure 1 represents a screenshot of VIAPPL during a game. Each circle 
represents a participant, the colours represent the two different groups and the line 
between two of the actors (tie) is created as one allocates the token to another (Durrheim 
et al., 2016). 
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Figure 1:  
VIAPPL Platform 
            
VIAPPL allows for the generalized exchange as well as the formulation and evolution of 
reputation and its influence on reciprocation in various experimental contexts. VIAPPL 
allows us to take the ideas of Nowak and Sigmund beyond the rigid interaction in their 
experiments and into a more complex analysis of generalized reciprocity. 
Based on the review of the literature conducted here, the following hypotheses are made: 
H1. There will be more ingroup reciprocation than outgroup reciprocation and self-giving. 
H2. Low status groups will show more ingroup reciprocation than high status groups. 
H3. The norm of competition will heighten ingroup reciprocation while the norm of fairness 
will lower ingroup reciprocation. 
H4. Due to an increase in reputation and the punishment of self and outgroup giving within 
the generalized exchange context, ingroup reciprocation will become stronger as time 
progresses in the game. 
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It is expected that the above effects will interact. If the is an alignment of the effects, 
ingroup reciprocation will increase, if there is no alignment, ingroup reciprocation will 
decrease. For instance, if individuals are playing in a high status and fairness condition, 
ingroup favouritism will become lower. 
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
 
 
This section will discuss the research design, the sampling, data collection, data analysis, 
ethical considerations, reliability, and validity of this study.  
Research design   
This study employed secondary data used in a previous publication (see Durrheim et al., 
2016 for further details). This study employed an experimental between subjects research 
design. The experimental software VIAPPL (see review of literature) was used to conduct 
and collect data used in this study. The VIAPPL experiments were described to the 
participants as a game. 
Individuals participated in one of 72 14-player lab-based experimental games, with each 
game instantiating one of 12 experimental conditions in a 2(individual, group) by 2(equal, 
unequal status) by 3(no norm, competition, or fairness norm condition) design. In total each 
condition had six replications (games). Conditions were played in random order and 
participants were thereby assigned randomly to conditions. Each game consisted of 40 
rounds where individuals were instructed to allocate one token per round to any other 
individual in the game. The value of the tokens was symbolic as each individual received R20 
for their participation in the study irrespective of their final token tally. A structural 
dependence existed between ingroup, outgroup, and self-giving as a result of the one token 
per round policy. The cumulative tokens given by each individual over the forty rounds was 
thus forty for each individual. 
The independent variables of this study were Group Context, Status, Norm Condition, Time, 
and Reciprocation Group. The dependant variable was Reciprocity. These experimental 
conditions were operationalized in the game as follows: 
Group Context: Individuals were randomly allocated to either undifferentiated groups or 
visually distinct groups. In the distinguished groups, where groups were visually distinct, 
minimal group allocation was random but participants were told that it was based on their 
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preference for a painting by Klee or Kandinsky. In the individual context, where the groups 
were undifferentiated, individuals were still allocated randomly to groups but there were no 
visual cues for group membership.  
Status: The status was manipulated independently of the Group Context. Half the games in 
the group and individual conditions were equal status games and the other half were 
unequal status games. There were therefore three levels to this condition; the equal status 
condition (n = 503), where all the participants started with the same number of tokens; the 
low status (n = 251), where individuals started with less tokens than the high status group; 
and high status (n= 252), where individuals started with more tokens than the low status 
groups. In the equality condition, all individuals began with 30 tokens each. In the inequality 
condition, the low status individuals began with 20 tokens each while the high status 
individuals began with 40 tokens each.  
Norm Condition: In order to actualize the Norm Condition, the verbal memory task 
developed by Hertel and Fiedler (Gaertner & Insko, 2000) was employed. Individuals took 
part in the task either to prime either no norm, fairness or competition. Neutral words, such 
as computer, car and tree, were used throughout the three primes. Only neutral words were 
used in the control (no norm) condition. Competition was evoked through words such as 
opponent, hostility, struggle; whereas the fairness prime included words such as balance, 
justice, and democratic. 
Time: The data were divided into 5 waves of roughly equal rounds, the number of tokens to 
the ingroup, the outgroup, and to self were summed independently. Since this analysis was 
focused on the consequences of giving, i.e. reciprocation, 39 0f the forty rounds in the game 
were viable in this regard – allocations in round 1 could not be reciprocations.  There were 
therefore 4 waves of 8 rounds each and one wave of 7 rounds making a total of five waves. 
Reciprocation Group: This refers to whether the net reciprocation being averaged for a 
particular round category was from the out group or the ingroup.  
Reciprocity (Dependant Variable): This was operationalized through the net number of 
tokens reciprocated to an individual in round n + 1 based on that individual’s giving in round 
n. Meaning, if an individual gave to the ingroup in round n, the net reciprocation would be 
the tokens from the ingroup minus the tokens from the outgroup in round n +1. If, on the 
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other hand, an individual gave to the outgroup in round n, the net reciprocation would be 
the token from the outgroup minus the tokens from the ingroup in round n + 1. If individuals 
gave to themselves in round n, the net reciprocation in round n + 1 was considered as 
structurally missing. The net reciprocation in the 39 rounds of each game was then averaged 
to create five chunks, referred to as waves, of net reciprocation for each individual (See 
Appendix 2).   
In operationalizing reciprocation, particular attention was paid to the fact that group-based 
reciprocation is confounded with simple ingroup favouritism (see review of literature). When 
individuals are giving to the ingroup, they could be reciprocating favour or simply giving to the 
ingroup irrespective of previous actions. By operationalizing reciprocation as relative giving from the 
ingroup and outgroup in round n + 1 based on an individual’s giving in round n (i.e. as net 
reciprocation), the measure used (Reciprocity) reflects the effect of the immediately preceding 
allocations in addition to basic ingroup favouritism (i.e. reflects group-based reciprocation).         
Sampling   
The original study employed convenience sampling in order to sample students of the University of 
KwaZulu-Natal. This was the most feasible method because of the large number of participants 
needed for the quantitative study. Convenience sampling allows researchers to obtain a sample in a 
timeous and inexpensive manner. Demographic factors were not of interest in the particular study. 
These were therefore not of interest in the sampling phase. 
1005 University of KwaZulu-Natal students were sampled (490 female, 476 Male; 855 Black, 27 
White, 49 Indian, 32 Coloured). The study was approved by the Human Sciences Research Ethics 
Committee of the University of KwaZulu-Natal (see Appendix 1). All the participants gave written 
informed consent. The anonymity of the participants was maintained as none of the participants 
could see the other participants because of the virtual nature of the experiments.    
Data collection   
This study employed secondary data collected in 2013. The data were collected by colleagues who 
were also basing their studies on the VIAPPL programme. The data were collected at the Psychology 
Lab at UKZN. A network of computers was used to run experiments. The experimenter set up the 
number of players, rounds, and the type of game in the particular experiment. The participant then 
gave informed consent and then logged on to the game. Participants allotted a single token each 
round. This information was saved on the programme, logging the sender, receiver and the group 
that each belonged to, as well as the trial and round number and the conditions of each trial. 
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Data analysis   
Quantitative data were employed in this study. The data were recorded on to the VIAPPL software 
and then exported to Excel. In each of the games, the participants were playing in either a status 
condition (equal or unequal), in a group condition (individual or group context), in a norm condition 
(no norm, norm of competition, or norm of fairness) or a mixture of the conditions. The following 
data were exported from the VIAPPL platform into Excel: 
• the tokens that the individuals gave to the ingroup, to the outgroup, and to themselves  
• the tokens individuals received from the ingroup, the outgroup, and from themselves 
•  the cumulative tokens  
• and the starting and ending tokens of each participant in each round.  
The data were then imported into the statistical package R for restructuring and analysis (See 
Appendix 2). All the excel files of the various games were combined to formulate one dataset. 
Using procedures in R, the data were then lagged so that the allocations of round n were aligned 
with the tokens received in round n+1. The variable Net Reciprocation was formulated from the 
data collected in the experiment. This tells us how many net tokens an individual received from 
the group they gave to in the previous round. If for instance, an individual gave a token to the 
outgroup and they received 0 tokens from the outgroup and 2 tokens from the ingroup, the net 
reciprocation would be -2. As seen in the formula below: 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟 𝑅𝑅) = (𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑁𝑁 𝑔𝑔𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅 𝑔𝑔𝑅𝑅𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟 𝑅𝑅 − 1) −
(𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑁𝑁 𝑔𝑔𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁 𝑔𝑔𝑅𝑅𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟 𝑅𝑅 − 1)    
From this, the Net Reciprocation variable was averaged out to create five waves of equal numbers of 
rounds. This created the ultimate outcome variable, Net Wave Reciprocation. This was separated 
into ingroup and outgroup reciprocation. This outcome variable was employed the interest of this 
study was the levels of ingroup and outgroup reciprocation (i.e. group-based reciprocation) rather 
than inter-individual reciprocation because of arguments and evidence showing how groups can 
influence reciprocation (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Yamagishi et al., 1999). 
A linear multilevel model was employed in this study. A linear multilevel model builds on the simple 
linear model while also accounting for characteristics in the data. This assists in the interpretation 
and conclusions of the research study (Oberg & Mahoney, 2007). Regression as well as general linear 
models are tremendously valuable and dynamic methods of statistical modelling. These methods 
can be employed to test hypotheses on correlation, treatment effects and interactions, and for 
estimation of means. Basic regression and linear models assume that the residuals are 
independently and identically distributed as N. This supposition suggests that the residuals need to 
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have a constant variance across the entire response variable as well as a mean of 0. Additionally, 
“…it is assumed that residual or unexplainable error is the only source of random variability” (Oberg 
& Mahoney, 2007, p. 214). Yet, as Oberg and Mahoney (2007) point out, in practice, a significant 
portion of experiments will not satisfy these assumptions. As a result of the research design or the 
data collection process, correlation amongst observations or multiple causes of random variation 
past that of the residual error may emerge. These features, correlation and multiple sources of 
error, are likely to result in inefficient and possibly deceptive research conclusions if basic regression 
or linear models are employed. In this study, multiple games were conducted which had the same 
condition (e.g. individuals played in distinguished groups, under the norm of fairness, and within 
unequal groups in more than one game) and multiple waves were experienced by each individual. 
These aspects added an error component to the analysis that was not random. As a result, a number 
of supplementary tools are necessary to reach the correct conclusions (Oberg & Mahoney, 2007).  
Linear multilevel models are potent and valuable methods across several applications and can be 
employed to tackle several study objectives (Oberg & Mahoney, 2007). In this particular study, linear 
multilevel models were employed to account for the non-random residual error caused by factors 
resulting from the data collection process – i.e. the multiple games which had the same condition as 
well as the multiple waves experienced by each participant in the study. The token giving was nested 
(1) in waves, (2) repeated by individuals, who, in turn, were (3) nested in games. 
Ethical Considerations 
Participants were offered a monetary incentive to participate in the experiments. Participation in the 
experiments was voluntary. Individuals were informed that they were grouped by painting when 
they were actually grouped randomly. Those who agreed to participate signed informed consent 
forms   
Confidentiality was guaranteed as participants remained anonymous. While participants logged in 
using their student number and LAN password this information was not linked to their results. It was 
stated in the informed consent form that the data collected in the experiment would not be 
destroyed and may be used in future research.      
Reliability 
Since the data that were used in this study were collected in an experimental setting, there 
is an expectation that the same results would be acquired in the same experimental 
context.   
38 | P a g e  
 
Reciprocation 
 
Validity  
The data that were used in this study were collected in an experimental context, the 
internal validity of the study is strong. Although, some threats to internal validity were 
observed. In particular, the repeated testing of the individuals over the 40 rounds of the 
game had the potential to confound the results due to fatigue that has been observed in 
repeated testing, particularly in computer-based exercises (see Savage & Waldman, 2008). 
Hess, Hensher, and Daly (2012) have however shown that fatigue may not have as 
significant an impact on final outcomes as first thought. Different experimenters were used 
in the various games which assisted in controlling for experimenter effect. This however, 
extenuated the incontinency in the context across the game. Multilevel models were, 
however, employed to mitigate these shortcomings.   
The external validity of the study is relatively weak due to the high control of the 
experimental situation. This study should, however, have stronger external validity 
compared to other minimal group experiments (Tajfel et al., 1971; Yamagishi et al., 1999). 
This is due to the generalized exchange context that is made possible by the VIAPPL 
platform and which more accurately represents real world exchanges allowing for greater 
generalization beyond the experimental condition and to real world interactions. Previous 
minimal group experiments have not provided this due to methodological limitations.  
Additionally, selection bias (Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, & Todd, 1998) may also be a threat 
to external validity with regards to this study. All the participants involved in this study were 
students at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Using these participants in this study made 
logistical sense and meant a large number of participants could be accessed with ease – as 
the lab in which the experiments were conducted is located at the Pietermaritzburg campus 
of the University of KwaZulu-Natal.  This makes it difficult to generalize these results beyond 
this specific population, the University of KwaZulu-Natal students. Much has been written 
on the unreliability of university students as a representative sample of the general 
population, particularly in social psychological research (see Peterson, 2001; Sears, 1986; & 
Henry, 2008).       
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Chapter 4 Results 
 
 
A mixed effects model using maximum likelihood estimation was run using the program R. 
The token giving was nested (1) in waves, (2) repeated by individuals, who, in turn, were (3) 
nested in games.  
An analysis of token allocation in round n and the tokens received in round n + 1 illustrates 
the effects of group-based reciprocation over and above ingroup favouritism. Even though 
the probability of an individual receiving a token from the ingroup in round n + 1 when 
individuals were in distinguished groups was relatively high even when individuals gave to 
the outgroup or to themselves in round n, the probability of receiving from the ingroup was 
highest when individuals gave to the ingroup. This suggests that even though simple ingroup 
favouritism is a factor, group-based reciprocation is also a factor. The probability of 
receiving a token from the outgroup in round n + 1 when individuals gave to the outgroup in 
round n was highest in undistinguished groups and lower in distinguished groups. This 
suggests that the presence of distinguished groups limit outgroup reciprocation. The 
probability of an individual giving to themselves in round n + 1 was highest when individuals 
gave to themselves in round n, both in distinguished and undistinguished groups. This 
suggests that self-giving may be constant throughout the game.         
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  Figure 2: Ingroup, outgroup, and self reciprocation     
This study assessed the levels of ingroup and outgroup reciprocation. Reciprocity could 
either be positive or negative. A negative reciprocity means that an individual was more 
likely to be favoured by the group they had not given to than the group they had given to. A 
positive reciprocity means that an individual was more likely to be favoured by the group 
they had given to than the group they had not given to. Overall, the mean reciprocity was 
0.053 – meaning that individuals were likely to be favoured more by the group they gave to. 
The mean ingroup Reciprocity was 0.131 and the mean outgroup reciprocity was -0.030. 
This means that when individuals gave to a member of the ingroup, they - on average - 
received more from the ingroup and that when individuals gave to the outgroup, they – on 
average – received less from the outgroup.  
The effects of Group Context, Norm Condition, Status, Time, and the Reciprocation Group 
(Independent Variables) on Reciprocity (Dependant Variable) were assessed. Ingroup and 
outgroup Reciprocity was roughly normally distributed although ingroup Reciprocity was 
slightly negatively skewed (See Figure 3).  A control for autocorrelation, CorAR1, was also 
added to the model in order to account the successive nature of the game (Gałecki & 
Burzykowski, 2013). 
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Figure 3: 
Distribution of the levels of ingroup and outgroup reciprocation 
A multilevel model was used due to the nested structure of the some of the factors. The 
token giving was nested in individuals, who, in turn, were nested in games. Multilevel 
modelling deals with the nested factors by randomizing the intercepts and slopes in a 
regression analysis (Browne & Rasbash, 2009). Hence, in this case, the intercepts and slopes 
of the game in individuals was randomized. Meaning that each individual and each game 
had their own slope and intercept (McCulloch & Neuhaus, 2001).   
A comparison of the goodness of fit of the fixed effects model and the random effects 
models was conducted. Firstly, the fixed effects model was compared to a model with 
random game effects. The comparison illustrated that the random effects model was 
significantly better than the fixed effects models. The random effects (AIC = 16912.41) 
improved the goodness of fit significantly when compared to the fixed effects model (AIC = 
16932.99, LRatio = 22.57675, Df = 2, p = 0.000). Second, the random game effects model 
was compared to a model with random game and individual effects. The goodness of fit of 
the random game and individual effects model ( AIC = 16914.14) was not significantly 
different when compared to the random game effects model (AIC = 16912.41, L.Ratio = 
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0.000, Df = 3, p = 0.998). An analysis of the impact autocorrelation on the goodness of fit of 
the model was conducted by comparing a model with the random game and individual 
effects and a model with random game and individual effects as well as a control for 
autocorrelation, corAR1. The analysis illustrated that the addition of the control for 
autocorrelation (AIC = 16605.41, L.Ratio = 164.844, Df = 2, p = 0.000) significantly improved 
the goodness of fit when compared to the randomized game and individual effects model. It 
was thus decided that the model with random game and individual effects as well as the 
control for autocorrelation would be employed in further analysis. 
Due to the random factors in the model and based on the work of Nakagawa and Schielzeth 
(2013) as well as Johnson (2014), a Pseudo R-Squared was calculated in order to establish 
the portion of variance in the responses accounted for by the factors in the model. The 
Pseudo R-Squared of the model when it did not account for the random factors was R2fixed 
model = 0.059 while for the random model R2random model = 0.063. This suggest that the random 
factor improved the predictive capacity of the model.         
An analysis of the residual plots (X axis: fitted values versus Y axis: standardized residuals) 
illustrated that the distribution of the residuals were randomly distributed and there was no 
discernible pattern. This suggests that there are no additional factors not accounted for that 
have an influence on the model (Chantarangsi, Liu, Bretz, Kiatsupaibul, & Hayter, 2016). 
There were also relatively few outlying residuals, with a large majority of the residuals lying 
between two standard deviations below zero and two standard deviation above zero (See 
Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Residuals 
An analysis of variance (anova) analysis of the mixed model illustrated that there were no 
significant five way or four way interactions at 0.05 (See Table 1). There was a single 
significant three way interaction between the Reciprocation Group, Group context, and the 
Norm Condition (Chisq = 8.4897, Df = 2, p = 0.01434). Two way interactions between Round 
Category and the Reciprocation Group (Chisq = 43.3780, Df = 4, p = 0.000) as well as the 
Reciprocation Group and Group context (Chisq = 181.6480, Df = 1, p = 0.000) were also 
significant. The Reciprocation Group was the only main effect that was significant (Chisq = 
139.2524, Df = 1, p = 0.000) (See Table 1). 
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Table 1: Anova Summary 
Condition Chi-Square Df P-value 
Reciprocation Group 139.2524 1 0.000 
Group Context 2.3973 1 0.122 
Status 0.7535 2 0.686 
Norm Condition 1.2104 2 0.546 
Time 7.1007 4 0.131 
Reciprocation Group: Group Context                                           181.648 1 0.000 
Reciprocation Group: Status                                      4.9956 2 0.082 
Group Context: Status 0.6538 2 0.721 
Reciprocation Group: Norm Condition 4.6995 2 0.095 
Group Context: Norm Condition 0.4011 2 0.818 
Status: Norm Condition 4.0124 4 0.404 
Reciprocation Group: Time                                                     43.378 4 0.000 
Group Context Individual: Time                                                                2.9666 4 0.563 
Status: Time                                                         5.3524 8 0.719 
Norm Condition: Time                                                           6.9135 8 0.546 
Reciprocation Group: Group Context: Status                                            0.467 2 0.792 
Reciprocation Group: Group Context: Norm Condition                                                8.4897 2 0.014 
Reciprocation Group: Status: Norm Condition                                         3.3889 4 0.495 
Group Context: Status: Norm Condition                                         5.8315 4 0.212 
Reciprocation Group: Group Context: Time                                                     2.6743 4 0.614 
Reciprocation Group: Status: Time                                            6.3162 8 0.612 
Group Context: Status: Time                                           5.6284 8 0.689 
Reciprocation Group: Norm Condition: Time                                                6.7499 8 0.564 
Group Context: Norm Condition: Time                                               1.8767 8 0.985 
Status: Norm Condition: Time                                         9.8325 16 0.875 
Reciprocation Group: Group Context: Status: Norm 
Condition                            
3.8635 4 0.425 
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Reciprocation Group: Group Context: Status: Time                                11.484 8 0.176 
Reciprocation Group: Status: Norm Condition: Time 9.224 16 0.904 
Group Context: Status: Norm Condition: Time 12.5421 16 0.706 
Reciprocation Group: Group Context: Status: Norm 
Condition: Time                   3.9764 16 0.999 
                                                                        
 
 
Table 2 illustrates the mixed effects. An analysis of the main effects shows that the 
Reciprocation Group has a significant effect on reciprocation and illustrates a group-based 
reciprocation bias (i.e. individuals are more likely to reciprocate to members of their own 
group than outgroup members). The results show that reciprocation to the outgroup (mean 
= -0.030) is significantly lower than reciprocation to the ingroup (mean = 0.131) (p = 0.000, t-
value = -8.096864, std. error = 0.041, Df = 8114, coef. = -0.335) (See Table 2). The means 
illustrate that when individuals give to the ingroup, they are – on average – likely to receive 
more from the ingroup than the outgroup (mean = 0.131). When individuals give to the 
outgroup, the are – on average – likely to receive less from the outgroup than the ingroup 
(mean = -0.030).     
The main effect of Group Context also had a significant effect (p = 0.000, t-value = -6.969, 
std. error = 0.037, Df = 66, coef. = -0.258) (See Table 2). The results show that individuals 
reciprocate significantly less when they are playing in an Individual context (mean = 0.037) 
then when they are playing in distinguished groups (mean = 0.070). The means illustrate 
that individuals are – on average – likely to receive more from the group they gave to when 
they are playing in distinguished groups (mean = 0.070) and Individual context (mean = 
0.037) but that what they receive is higher in distinguished groups.      
An analysis of the interaction effect between Group context and the Reciprocation Group 
illustrated a significant effect (p = 0.000, t-value = 9.517, std. error = 0.047, Df = 8114, coef. 
= 0.448) (See Table 2). The results show that, when individuals are playing in distinguished 
groups, they are significantly more likely to reciprocate to ingroup members (mean = 0.260), 
and less likely to reciprocate to the outgroup (mean = -0.118) illustrating a group-based 
reciprocation bias. The means illustrate that when individuals are in distinguished groups, 
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they receive more than they gave if they gave to the ingroup (mean = 0.260) and receive 
less than they gave if they gave to the outgroup (mean = -0.118). When individuals were 
playing in the individual context, they received more than they gave when they gave both to 
the ingroup (mean = 0.027) and the outgroup (mean = 0.047). This again illustrates the 
influence of distinguished groups in promoting group-based reciprocation bias.   
The main effect of the Norm Condition is significant. The results show that individuals 
playing in both the condition of fairness (mean = 0.037) and the no norm condition (0.057) 
reciprocate less than individuals in the condition of competition (mean = 0.063). The norm 
of fairness was, however, the only one that was significant, showing that the only significant 
difference was between fairness and competition manipulations (p = 0.003, t-value = -3.126, 
std. error = 0.037, Df = 66, coef. = -0.115) (See Table 2). The two way interaction between 
Group context and Norm Condition shows that, even though reciprocation was still higher in 
distinguished groups, the Norm Condition of fairness lowered reciprocation in the 
distinguished groups when compared to  the other Norm Conditions (p = 0.033, t-value = 
2.183, std. error = 0.052, Df = 66, coef. = 0.114, see figure 5) suggesting that fairness 
reduces group-based reciprocation bias. The means illustrate that in distinguished groups, 
individuals received more than they gave in all three norm conditions (no norm = 0.073; 
fairness = 0.048; competition = 0.089) but that they received the least in the Norm 
Condition of fairness. The same was true in the Individual Context (no norm = 0.043; 
fairness = 0.028; competition = 0.039). 
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Figure 5: Fairness moderating group-based reciprocation bias 
Additionally individuals were also seen to reciprocate more to the outgroup in the Norm 
Condition of fairness compared to the Norm of competition (p = 0.000, t-value = 3.586, std. 
error = 0.047, Df = 8114, coef. = 0.170) (See Table 2). The means illustrate that when 
individuals gave to the outgroup, they received less than they gave in all three conditions 
(no norm = -0.027; fairness = -0.025; competition = -0.037). When individuals gave to the 
ingroup, they received more than they gave in all three conditions (no norm = 0.136; 
fairness = 0.098; competition = 0.158).        
The above was qualified by the three way interaction between Group Context, Norm 
Condition, and Reciprocation Group which shows that individuals still reciprocate more to 
the ingroup in distinguished groups but that the Norm Condition of fairness moderates 
ingroup reciprocation (See Figure 6), significantly lowering it, while competition strengthens 
it (p = 0.005, t-value = -2.825, std. error = 0.066, Df = 8114, coef. = -0.187) (See Table 2). In 
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the individual context, there is no difference in the ingroup and outgroup reciprocation 
when the three normative scripts are considered. Furthermore, the norm of fairness did not 
significantly moderate ingroup reciprocation. The means illustrate that even though in 
distinguished groups, when individuals gave to the outgroup, they – on average – received 
less from the outgroup in all three Norm Conditions. However, the Norm Condition of 
Fairness increased reciprocation towards the outgroup effectively moderating group-based 
reciprocation bias while the Norm Condition of Competition heightened it (See Figure 6).       
Figure 6: The moderation of group-based reciprocation bias by the norm of fairness 
     
An analysis of Time (round categories) shows that individuals reciprocate more and more as 
the game progresses, particularly from the second category of rounds onwards. Individuals 
reciprocate significantly more in the third category (p = 0.002, t-value = 3.088, std. error = 
0.027, Df = 8114, coef. = 0.084, mean = 0.064) of rounds than the in the first round (mean = 
0.025). They reciprocate significantly more so in the fourth round (p = 0.000, t-value = 3.587, 
std. error = 0.027, Df = 8114, coef.0.098, mean = 0.071). Reciprocation weakens slightly in 
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the fifth category of rounds (mean = 0.063) compared to the fourth category of rounds 
(mean = 0.071), it was still significantly higher than the first category of rounds (p = 0.000, t-
value = 5.468, std. error = 0.027, Df = 8114, coef. = 0.150) (See Table 2).  
The main effect described above was qualified by a two-way interaction between 
Reciprocation Group and Time. The interaction between the reciprocation group and the 
round category illustrates that individuals reciprocate to the ingroup significantly more and 
significantly less to the outgroup as Time progresses in the game effectively increasing 
group–based reciprocation over time (See Figure 7). The results show that individuals 
reciprocate to the outgroup significantly less in the third category (p = 0.017, t-value = -
2.384, std. error = 0.039, Df = 8114, coef. = -0.093) of rounds than they did in the first round. 
The reciprocate even less to the outgroup in the fourth category of rounds (p = 0.004, t-
value = -2.891, std. error = 0.040, Df = 8114, coef. = -0.114) and even less so in the fifth 
category of rounds (p = 0.000, t-value = -5.992, std. error = 0.041, Df = 8114, coef. = -0.243) 
(See Table 2). The means illustrate that individuals – on average – received more from the 
ingroup when they gave to the ingroup and received less from the outgroup when they gave 
to the outgroup and that this was true throughout the game (See Figure 7).  
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Figure 7: The strengthening of group-based reciprocation bias over time 
The Status main effect as well as an interactions involving Status were not significant. This 
suggests that the relative Status of individuals does not have an influence on the 
reciprocation of individuals. However, the interaction between Status and the Reciprocation 
Group was partially significant.  
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Table 2: Mixed Effects 
  Coefficient Standard Error  DF t-value p-value 
Intercept 0.214 0.031 8114 6.947 0.000 
Reciprocation Group: Outgroup Reciprocation -0.335 0.041 8114 -8.097 0.000 
Group Context: Individual -0.258 0.037 66 -6.969 0.000 
Time: Phase 2 0.026 0.026 8114 1.013 0.311 
Time: Phase 3 0.084 0.027 8114 3.088 0.002 
Time: Phase 4 0.098 0.027 8114 3.587 0.000 
Time: Phase 5 0.15 0.027 8114 5.468 0.000 
Norm Condition: Fairness -0.115 0.037 66 -3.126 0.003 
Norm Condition: No Norm -0.046 0.037 66 -1.248 0.216 
Reciprocation Group: Outgroup Reciprocation – Group 
Context: Individual 0.448 0.047 8114 9.517 0.000 
Reciprocation Group: Outgroup Reciprocation – Time: 
Phase 2 -0.02 0.037 8114 -0.535 0.593 
Reciprocation Group: Outgroup Reciprocation – Time: 
Phase 3 -0.093 0.039 8114 -2.384 0.017 
Reciprocation Group: Outgroup Reciprocation – Time: 
Phase 4 -0.114 0.039 8114 -2.891 0.004 
Reciprocation Group: Outgroup Reciprocation – Time: 
Phase 5 -0.243 0.041 8114 -5.992 0.000 
Reciprocation Group: Outgroup Reciprocation – Norm 
Condition: Fairness 0.17 0.047 8114 3.586 0.000 
Reciprocation Group: Outgroup Reciprocation – Norm 
Condition: No Norm 0.061 0.05 8114 1.279 0.201 
Group Context: Individual – Norm Condition: Fairness 0.114 0.052 66 2.183 0.033 
Group Context: Individual – Norm Condition: No norm 0.048 0.052 66 0.913 0.365 
Reciprocation Group Outgroup reciprocation – Group 
Context: Individual – Norm Condition: Fairness -0.187 0.066 8114 -2.825 0.005 
Reciprocation Group Outgroup reciprocation – Group 
Context: Individual – Norm Condition: No Norm -0.055 0.067 8114 -0.822 0.411 
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Chapter 5 Discussion 
 
Findings of Study 
The aims of this study were to assess how Group Context, Normative Scripts, Status, and the 
passage of Time influence the levels of group-based reciprocation and its evolution in the 
minimal group context. In this section, the results of this study will be discussed in relation 
to the literature discussed earlier. 
The results of the analysis supported H1: There will be more ingroup reciprocation than 
outgroup reciprocation in the distinguished groups, H3: The norm of competition will 
heighten ingroup reciprocation while the norm of fairness will lower ingroup reciprocation, 
and H4: Ingroup reciprocation will become stronger over time, but not H2: Low status 
groups will show more ingroup reciprocation then high status groups. There was group-
based reciprocation bias in the distinguished groups, more specifically; individuals 
reciprocated more to members of their own group. With regards to the normative scripts, 
ingroup reciprocation was still higher in the distinguished groups when compared to the 
outgroup. However, the normative script of fairness tended to moderate ingroup 
reciprocation. Meaning, individuals reciprocated less to members of their own group and 
more to members of the outgroup in the norm condition of fairness than they did in the no 
norm condition and the norm condition of competition. The norm of competition 
strengthened group-based reciprocation in the distinguished groups. This offers support for 
H3. The analysis showed that group-based reciprocation bias strengthened as time 
progressed in the game. More specifically, ingroup reciprocation became stronger as time 
progressed in the game. This supports H4, as this outcome suggests that the reputation of 
individuals as ingroup reciprocators is reinforced due to early ingroup giving which 
encourages ingroup reciprocation later, which additionally promotes further ingroup 
reciprocation. This shows the evolutionary nature of reciprocation in a generalized exchange 
context. The status conditions were not significant. 
Since the time when Malinowski (1932) argued that reciprocation was the “social 
machinery” on which society was built, many researchers have showed an interest on 
reciprocation (including Patterson, 1970: Altman, 1973: and Gouldner, 1960). These authors 
53 | P a g e  
 
Reciprocation 
 
argued that individuals will help those who can help them in the future and those who had 
helped them in the past. Malinowski (1932) argued that individuals were operating under 
the following assumptions: (a) in a prolonged interaction of individuals in the exchange of 
goods and services, the benefits accrued will balance out between the individuals; or (b) 
when individuals do not reciprocate the positive actions of others towards them, they will 
experience negative consequences from other individuals; or (c) there is an expectation that 
those that they help will help them in the future. Here reciprocation is seen as purely a 
utilitarian exercise, where individuals will help those who can help them not accounting for 
group dynamics, status, or the prescribed norms in the interaction. 
Gouldner (1960) argued that in addition to this utilitarian motivations of individuals, there is 
a moral norm of reciprocity that means that individuals feel a moral obligation to help those 
who have helped them and not hurt those who have helped them.  
The results of this study illustrate that reciprocation does not necessarily operate in this 
way. It has been shown that individuals reciprocate differently when group dynamics are 
introduced. Even though reciprocation was present overall, the presence of distinguishable 
groups served to strengthen ingroup reciprocation and largely extinguish outgroup 
reciprocation resulting in group-based reciprocation bias.  
Thibaut and Kelley (1958) pointed out that individuals may reciprocate more towards 
individuals in their own group, particularly in large and generalized groups, due to a mutual 
fate control. Yamagishi et al. (1999) built on this understanding and developed the theory of 
Bounded Generalized Reciprocity. This was anticipated by Rabbie et al.’s (1989). Rabbie and 
his colleagues’ work was some of the earliest on intergroup dynamics and reciprocation in 
the minimal group situation. This work was a criticism towards Tajfel & Turner’s (1985) 
interpretation of the findings of their minimal group studies. Rabbie et al. (1989) argued 
that the ingroup favouritism seen in Tajfel et al.’s (1971) minimal group experiments was as 
a result of ingroup interdependence rather than outgroup discrimination and that 
individuals would favour whoever could reciprocate. Rabbie et al. (1989) argued for 
unbounded reciprocation, meaning that individuals will favour and reciprocate to those who 
can help them in the future. This is similar to the arguments made by Malinowski (1932) and 
Gouldner (1960). 
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The theory of Bounded Generalized Reciprocity on the other hand argues the reciprocation 
is bounded (Yamagishi et al., 1999). This means that individuals are more likely to 
reciprocate to ingroup members who help them than outgroup members who help them 
specifically because of the ingroup interdependence pointed out by Rabbie et al. (1989). 
Yamagishi et al. (1999) argued that individuals are likely to favour ingroup members when 
reciprocating because they have evolved to do so. It is argued that groups played a 
fundamental role in the reproduction and survival of individuals. Individuals are usually 
dependant on group members when group dynamics and are present and defer to this 
when they are faced with group dynamics and engage in generalized exchange as they do in 
other group contexts.  
The results of this study have shown that the assertions of Malinowski (1932) and Gouldner 
(1960) - that individuals will reciprocate to those individuals that have helped them and help 
those that can help them in the future - even though somewhat true, are limited. The 
findings of this study show that group dynamics can influence group-based reciprocation. 
Individuals reciprocate more to members of their own group than to members of the 
outgroup when they are in defined groups. Individuals engage in bounded generalized 
reciprocity as postulated by Yamagishi et al. (1999). As Yamagishi et al. (1999) pointed out; 
individuals reciprocate to ingroup members who help them and less so to outgroup 
members who help them. Reciprocation is not unbounded, as Rabbie et al. (1989) argued, 
but rather bounded by group membership. This was the case in this study. The findings of 
this study offer strong support for Yamagishi et al.’s (1999) Theory of Bounded Generalized 
Reciprocity. The norm of reciprocation changes in the distinguished groups from “I need to 
help those who help me” to “I should help those closest to me who are most likely to help 
me in the future”.  
The normative scripts prevalent also influence reciprocation. An alternative explanation of 
the results of the original minimal group experiments was that the intergroup dynamics of 
the minimal group experiments induced a generic norm of cooperation among group 
members (Berkowitz 1994; Gerard and Hoyt 1974). Building on this, Hertel and Kerr (2000) 
argued and illustrated that when other norms other than ingroup cooperation are primed, 
ingroup favouritism can be reduced or heightened depending on the norm primed. They 
found that ingroup favouritism was heightened when the norm of loyalty was primed; they 
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also found that ingroup favouritism was lower when the norm of equality was primed. In the 
latter case, individuals were more likely to favour outgroup members.  
The aim of this study was to assess if the priming of different normative scripts would result 
in individuals reciprocating differently. The norms that were primed in this study were 
competition and fairness. The results showed that ingroup reciprocation permeated all 
normative scripts. Meaning that individuals, regardless of the normative script primed, are 
more likely to reciprocate to the ingroup when playing in the distinguished groups. This 
shows the strength of norms of ingroup favouritism even in the face of competing norms. 
The results did however, also show that, when primed, the normative script of fairness 
lowered the amount of ingroup reciprocation and increased the amount of outgroup 
reciprocation. These results suggest that although individuals are likely to favour the 
ingroup regardless of the prevailing norms when reciprocating, the norm of fairness can 
encourage individuals to be reciprocate in a way that they see as fair, to an extent, either by 
reciprocating to individuals who have relatively low resources in the game regardless of 
group affiliation or by reciprocating to individuals who have helped them regardless of 
group affiliation. This brings to mind Gouldner’s (1960) moral norm of reciprocity. Fairness is 
in a sense a moral norm (see Folger, 1998) and Gouldner’s moral norm of reciprocity is 
rooted in fairness, i.e. one should help those who have helped them regardless of group 
affiliation. The norm of fairness may make individuals feel that they have to help those who 
have helped them in the same way that the moral norm of reciprocity was posited to.  
When the norm of competition was primed, it strengthened group-based reciprocation bias. 
Tajfel and Turner (1985) argued that, in the context of distinguished groups, individuals 
engage in intergroup competition in order to promote group distinctiveness. This study 
found that group-based reciprocation bias was highest when the norm of competition was 
primed as opposed to no norm being primed or more especially when the norm of fairness 
was primed. This shows that in the same way that norms that promote fairness can develop, 
where individuals somewhat forgo group belonging when reciprocating, norms that 
promote competition between groups can also develop, where individuals are rewarded 
even more for favouring the ingroup. This finding also shows that under certain conditions, 
where groups are motivated to compete, group-based reciprocation bias can be used as a 
tool to compete with other groups, ensuring that resources stay within the group.     
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The status of individuals was also postulated to affect the pattern of reciprocation in 
intergroup contexts. Previous findings have shown that, in the context of illegitimate 
inequality, low status group individuals will practice ingroup favouritism and high status 
groups will practice outgroup favouritism as a compensatory measure (Rubin et al., 2014; 
Durrheim et al., 2016). The status condition was not seen to influence reciprocation. 
Individuals did not reciprocate differently from each other based on their status. This is 
different from previous interdependence research that used the similar methods and found 
that low status group favour outgroup members (Durrheim et al., 2016). This illustrates that 
there is a difference between simple outcome interdependence and reciprocation. 
Additionally, this also illustrates that while our measure of group-based reciprocation in 
intertwined with ingroup favouritism, it has distinct reciprocative elements.   
As stated earlier, Gouldner (1960) argued that a moral norm of reciprocity that goes beyond 
the utilitarian explanation is necessary for maintaining social stability through reciprocity 
due to the, “…disruptive potentialities of power differences” (p. 174). Meaning, the 
disruptive potentialities of inequality in this context. He stated that due to power 
differences amongst individuals inherent in society, powerful individuals might attempt to 
gain benefits without reciprocating them. This circumstance is ripe for the crumbling of 
reciprocity and the social systems it maintains. The norm of reciprocity, however, stimulates 
the need to repay benefits that have been incurred from other individuals even in a 
situation where the power dynamics at play could lead to the exploitation of certain 
individuals. The findings of this study, that status does not influence reciprocation, could be 
explained by the norm of reciprocity. The findings suggest that individuals are not affected 
by the power differences in the game and reciprocate how they would otherwise 
reciprocate due to the norm of reciprocity. The norm of reciprocity may be stronger than 
any norm that would develop as a result of inequality. This is different from the norm of 
ingroup reciprocation that develops due to distinguished groups which appears to be 
stronger than the generalized norm of reciprocity.       
In evolutionary models, reputation is one of many signs that signals the way in which an 
individual is likely to act in interactions. These signs could relate to various facets of 
behaviour, such as skill or dominance (Tennie et al., 2011). This study particularly focused on 
the evolution of reciprocation as a result of the evolution of individual’s reputation with 
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regards to reciprocation.  In contexts like those in the VIAPPL experiments, Tennie et al. 
(2011) argue that reputation plays a fundamental part in sustaining social cohesion. It 
provides incentive tools that reduce uncooperative behaviour, behaviour that goes against 
the expected and prevailing behaviour within the group, and influences the decisions of 
individuals in social interactions.    
The challenge for evolutionary theories is to explain how such cooperative behaviour can 
evolve. Indirect reciprocity theory argues that cooperative persons benefit in the long run 
through increased cooperation from others. Here, the pricey initial act is an investment, as it 
is expected that it will be repaid at a later date (Tennie et al., 2011). In this situation, 
“…reputation is needed to establish cooperation. Uncooperative behaviour results in a bad 
reputation, which is associated with several disadvantages. As a result, reputation is a 
stabilising factor, reducing the likelihood of uncooperative behaviour” (Tennie et al., 2011, 
p. 3). 
The results of the present research show the evolution norm of ingroup reciprocation over 
time. The finding that ingroup reciprocation (group-based reciprocation bias) becomes 
stronger over time in the VIAPPL experiment is an illustration of the effect of reputation. As 
discussed earlier, there were five time phases in the game. Individuals enter the game with 
an understanding of group dynamics and are for this reason more likely to reciprocate more 
to ingroup members at the outset (Yamagishi et al., 1999). Therefore it was not surprising to 
see that individuals reciprocated more to ingroup members then they did to outgroup 
members in the first phase, particularly in distinguished groups. The arguments of Yamagishi 
et al. (1999) need refinement in order to explain why reciprocation becomes progressively 
stronger as time advances in the game (i.e. in phases 2, 3, 4, and 5). 
This can be explained by the evolution of the norm of ingroup reciprocation through its 
reinforcement over time (Tennie et al., 2011). The finding that ingroup reciprocation 
strengthens over time indicates that individuals are not static but are dynamic in their 
thinking (i.e. their thinking will evolve based on the actions of other individuals). At the 
beginning of the game, individuals seek to maintain a good reputation amongst ingroup 
members as they believe that ingroup members are the ones most likely to favour them due 
to previous experience. The results show that early in the game, ingroup giving was likely to 
be reciprocated and outgroup giving was unlikely to be reciprocated. This likely served to 
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reinforce the belief individuals had at the beginning of the game – that ingroup members 
were more likely to reward them. Individuals therefore gave more and reciprocated more to 
the ingroup as their convictions about the ingroup strengthened. This strengthens the norm 
of ingroup reciprocation and thus the evolution of reciprocation.     
While previous research has focused on the evolution on inter-individual reciprocation 
(Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998a; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998b; Ohtsuki, 
Iwasa, & Nowak, 2009; Nowak, 2006; and Brandt, & Sigmund, 2006), this study focused on 
the evolution of the levels of intergroup reciprocation. These studies could not therefore 
show the strengthening of ingroup reciprocation and the strengthening of ingroup 
reciprocation.    
Even though the norm of fairness was seen to develop when primed and influence 
reciprocation, it did not evolve over time in the same way that groups did. Ingroup 
reciprocation became stronger as time progressed while the norm of fairness did not alter 
the levels of reciprocation over time. Feldman (1984) argued that those norms that are 
beneficial to the group are more likely to be reinforced and are reinforced more strongly. 
Reciprocating to ingroup members rather than outgroup members is the most beneficial 
norm of reciprocation as it keeps resources within the ingroup. On the other hand, even the 
norm of fairness is socially acceptable; it is not beneficial to the ingroup and may therefore 
be reinforced less strongly than ingroup reciprocation. Individuals will subscribe most to the 
norms that are reinforced the strongest (Tennie et al., 2011) in order to maintain a good 
reputation. Therefore, in order to maintain a good reputation, if the norm of ingroup 
reciprocation is reinforced the strongest, individuals will reciprocate more to the ingroup 
and as this increased reciprocation will be reinforced more over time, and strengthen. This 
may not be the case for the norm of fairness as it is less beneficial to the ingroup. This norm 
is reinforced but not as strongly as ingroup reciprocation.  
Game theory is usually employed in psychology, economics, and political science to study 
rational decision-making. In recent times, various forms of game theory have been used to 
study reciprocation, ingroup favouritism, and interdependence in the minimal group 
situation (Balliet, Wu, & De Dreu, 2014). These include trust games, prisoner’s dilemma 
game, public goods dilemmas, and resource dilemmas. These methods however have limits. 
To address these limits, this study employed VIAPPL, which is an experimental software in 
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which the interactional aspects of social life can be realistically assessed in intergroup 
dynamics (Durrheim et al., 2016). As discussed earlier, the use of traditional game theory to 
study intergroup dynamics in the minimal group situation is often rigid. The use of VIAPPL 
allows for the dynamic assessment of various forms of group interaction in the minimal 
group situation.  
This study has illustrated how VIAPPL can be used as a tool to study reciprocation in a 
generalized exchange context as well as the evolution of reciprocation in this context. This 
sort of analysis would not have been possible with standard methods of game theory 
including the matrices employed by Tajfel et al. (1971), Rabbie et al. (1989), or Yamagishi et 
al. (1999). The VIAPPL platforms has illustrated that individuals reciprocate more and more 
to the ingroup as time progresses in the game. It has also illustrated that, in a generalized 
context, individuals will engage in generalized reciprocity. 
Contributions of Study 
The main contribution of this study is to the understanding of the evolution of reciprocation 
in a generalized exchange context with the assistance of VIAPPL. As has been discussed, 
previous research on reciprocation and interdependence in general has employed 
conventional game theory, which makes the analysis of the evolution of reciprocation in a 
generalized context difficult. This study has shown that ingroup reciprocation norms can 
strengthen over time.     
This study has also contributed to the literature by showing how normative scripts can 
influence reciprocation in the minimal group situation. Previous research has focused on 
how normative scripts influence ingroup favouritism and not necessarily how they influence 
reciprocation in the minimal group situation. This study showed that although ingroup 
reciprocation is pervasive in all situations in the group context, the norm condition of 
fairness can serve to moderate this. 
The assessment of the influence of status in generalized context of reciprocation is also a 
novel contribution of this study. Previous research (Rubbin et al., 2014) has focused on the 
influence of status on ingroup favouritism rather than reciprocation. This study showed that 
status does not influence reciprocation. 
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Limitations 
This study assessed the levels of ingroup and outgroup reciprocation in the minimal group 
context under various contexts (group context, normative scripts, and inequality). This study 
argued that individuals will reciprocate in order to build or maintain a good reputation in a 
particular context and that their behaviour will be reinforced or punished based on their 
behaviour. Even though this is the case, this study did not assess the reputation of 
individuals. For instance, in the group context, it was not assessed that the reputation of 
those individuals who gave to the outgroup was indeed lower than those who gave to the 
ingroup as the literature argued (Yamagishi et al., 1999; Tennie, 2011). The assessment of 
the reputation had the potential to strengthen the analysis of this study since it is 
postulated that individuals will reciprocate in order to maintain a good reputation.   
Another limitation of this study is due to the statistical techniques employed. In an attempt 
to account for nesting autocorrelation in the data, this study employed statistical techniques 
that assumed interdependencies between individuals that resulted in the removal of real 
interdependencies between individuals. Future research needs to find a way to study these 
inter-individual interdependencies as they would provide valuable insight into inter 
individual reciprocation and the networks that develop within the larger context of 
intergroup interaction.    
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
 
 
Early conceptualizations of reciprocation postulated that individuals will reciprocate to all 
those individuals that help them either for utilitarian purposes (Malinowski, 1932) or for 
moral purposes (Gouldner, 1960). 
The work of Thibaut and Kelley (1959) served to problematize this by pointing out the way 
in which group contexts can influence outcome interdependence amongst ingroup and 
outgroup members. The minimal group studies of Tajfel et al. (1971) illustrated the ways in 
which group dynamics can influence the distribution of resources between group members. 
While Tajfel and Turner (1985) explained these results in terms of Social Identity Theory, 
Yamagishi et al. (1999) explained the results in terms of bounded generalized reciprocity. 
While the work of Yamagishi et al. (1999), Tajfel et al. (1971) and other works (such as 
Rabbie, 1989) have been monumental in our understanding of interdependence and 
reciprocation, this work has been limited by the tools employed to study interdependence 
and reciprocation. 
The Virtual Interaction Application Platform gives researchers an opportunity to further 
research on reciprocation by allowing for the study of reciprocation in a truly generalized 
context as well as the evolution of reciprocation in the minimal group situation.  
In addition to assessing the influence of group dynamics on reciprocation, this study 
intended to study the influence of normative scripts and status on reciprocation on 
reciprocation as well as the evolution of reciprocation over time. 
Tajfel and Turner (1985) argued that individuals favoured ingroup members in order to 
improve their social identity which is linked to their confidence. However, Yamagishi and 
Kiyonari (2000, p. 117) point out when referring to Tajfel’s et al. (1971) minimal group 
experiment, that there is, “…a residue of interdependence existing in the form of mutual or 
multilateral fate control”. This observation is grounded on the recognition that the minimal 
group situation is not as minimal as was first thought. The minimal group situation was 
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thought to be void of an interdependence of the participants’ interests; in that one’s actions 
affected other participants’ actions and that the actions of other participants indirectly 
affect one’s interests. There is a mutual interdependence of individuals. When the 
outcomes of individuals are dependent ingroup and outgroup members, Yamagishi et al. 
(1999) argued that as a result of historical and evolutionary cues, individuals will reciprocate 
more to ingroup members, a norm of ingroup reciprocation develops. As Thibaut and Kelley 
(1959) pointed out, generally, there is a mutual fate control amongst ingroup members in 
social situations and individuals therefore favour ingroup members. Individuals import these 
cues into other group contexts, including the minimal group situation. This study therefore 
hypothesized that individuals would reciprocate more to ingroup members that outgroup 
members. The results of this study offered support for this hypothesis, illustrating that 
individuals are more likely to reciprocate to ingroup members in group contexts.            
The argument of a generic norm of cooperation postulates that individuals may favour 
members of the ingroup merely due to the fact that it is a social norm, which refers to, “a 
social script prescribing favouritism or loyalty to one’s group as an expected and socially 
approved behaviour” (Hertel & Kerr, 2000, p. 317). Hertel and Kerr (2000) illustrated that 
when norms other than ingroup cooperation are salient, such as equality or fairness, 
individuals distributed resources in accordance with the prescribed norm. The present study 
showed that, in a generalized context, the norm condition of fairness moderated ingroup 
reciprocation and increased outgroup reciprocation. It is assumed that in this norm, 
individuals became more likely to favour those with less resources when reciprocating 
rather than those of their own group. The norm of completion on the other hand 
strengthened group-based reciprocation bias. This suggests that in that same way that the 
norm of fairness can moderate group-based reciprocation bias, norms of competition can 
heighten group-based reciprocation bias.  
This study did not find that intergroup inequality influenced reciprocation. Rubin et al. 
(2014) found that members of low status groups generally utilized two strategies to get over 
the inequity, compensatory ingroup favouritism and competitive ingroup favouritism. Rubin 
et al. (2014) thus argued that it is conceivable groups of lower status can employ ingroup 
favouritism in two different ways and for two different reasons. Ingroup favouritism was 
employed to compete with an outgroup of a higher status so as to achieve positive ingroup 
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distinctiveness. Rubin et al. call this approach competitive ingroup favouritism. Ingroup 
favouritism was also employed to compensate the ingroup for its low status so as to realize 
intergroup fairness. They call this approach compensatory ingroup favouritism. Therefore, 
competitive favouritism raises a low status group to a level better than that of the outgroup, 
while compensatory ingroup favouritism raises a group of a low status to a level that is the 
same as the out-group. Studies employing methods similar to the present study found that 
low status groups practice compensatory ingroup favouritism and high status groups 
practice compensatory outgroup favouritism in order to promote equality in the context of 
illegitimate inequality. Status was not seen to influence ingroup or outgroup reciprocation in 
this study. Gouldner’s (1960) moral norm of reciprocity may explain why status did not 
influence reciprocation. The power disparities created by the inequality may be 
overpowered by the moral norm of reciprocity. 
In evolutionary models, reputation is one of many signs that signal the way in which an 
individual is likely to act in interactions. These signs could relate to various facets of 
behaviour, such as skill or dominance (Tennie, Frith, & Frith, 2011). This study, however, 
focused on behaviour in reciprocal interactions, and on reputation as an indication of the 
level of cooperativeness and reciprocity in various types of interactions, such intergroup 
interactions. This study illustrated that in group contexts, group-based reciprocation bias 
strengthens over time.  
Studies examining this process have also been conducted using two player games. These 
games are dyadic is nature and do not allow for a generalized interaction. Generalized 
reciprocity and reputation cannot be observed in this situation as group of individuals 
cannot effectively observe the actions of other individuals and form opinions regarding 
those individuals’ reputations as well as have the opportunity to react accordingly. Those 
individuals are also not afforded the opportunity to respond and allow for the evolution of 
their reputations. With the help of a new technology (VIAPPL), many of the shortcomings of 
previous reciprocation and interdependence studies have been addressed in this study. This 
study has been able to study reciprocation in a generalized context as well as assess the 
evolution of reciprocation in a generalized context. Additionally, this study has been able to 
quantify the level of reciprocation in ways that previous studies were unable to due to 
methodological limitations. The studies of Yamagishi et al. (1999) as well as Nowak and 
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Sigmund (1998) studied whether or not individuals reciprocate and not necessarily the 
amount of reciprocation in each act. 
The results of this study add to the understanding of how discrimination in society develops 
by showing the conditions that can influence ingroup favouritism through reciprocation. The 
results of this study can aid future research in understanding how the processes of 
interaction and reciprocation between individual can promote and strengthen intergroup 
discrimination. Additionally, the norm of reciprocation is essentially a norm of social 
influence. Due to the importance of technology, of particular interest recently is the study of 
how individuals can be persuaded - through their desire reciprocate - to divulge passwords 
and other sensitive information (Happ, Melzer, & Steffgen, 2016). Little research however, 
has studied how group identification can influence social influence through reciprocation in 
this area and the results of this study (that ingroup reciprocation is stronger than outgroup 
reciprocation) show that this may be a valuable avenue of research.        
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